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SAFEGUARDING THE FREE EXERCISE OF
RELIGION DURING THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC
Jiwoon Kong*
Religious worship is fundamentally rooted in physical and intimate
interactions. For instance, the Bible calls on Christian congregations to
physically gather, receive the Lord’s Supper, sing praises, and confess their
sins directly before ordained ministers. However, as the highly contagious
and airborne COVID-19 disease relentlessly swept across the nation,
religious establishments balanced fundamental religious traditions with the
inherent dangers of carrying out such traditions. Inevitably, the free exercise
of religion faces an unprecedented challenge as governors continue to enact
executive orders limiting in-person religious worship gatherings. The
jurisprudence thus far has shown alarming inconsistency in the protection of
free exercise of religion, and this Note calls on the U.S. Supreme Court to
provide clearer guidance for lower courts. Importantly, this Note argues that
freedoms explicitly enumerated in the Bill of Rights nevertheless deserve the
highest level of protection when infringed or burdened.
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INTRODUCTION
On May 20, 2020, the First Pentecostal Church in Holly Springs,
Mississippi, burned to the ground.1 Underneath the smoldering mass of
debris, graffiti on the church parking lot pavement read “Bet you Stay home
Now YOU HYPOKRITS.”2 A few weeks prior, the church had filed a suit
against the city for prohibiting in-person services, but with the church
building now burned to the ground, the city argued that “the Church’s First
Amendment claim necessarily went up in smoke when the church did.”3
Although the city had permitted the church to hold drive-in services, Pastor
Jerry Waldrop nevertheless decried the destruction of the church “because
his congregants wanted to worship in-person.”4

1. See First Pentecostal Church of Holly Springs v. City of Holly Springs, 959 F.3d 669,
670 (5th Cir. 2020) (Willett, C.J., concurring).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Caleb Parke, Mississippi Pastor Says Church Was Burned Down “to Shame Us for
Worshipping Together,” FOX NEWS (May 28, 2020), https://www.foxnews.com/us/
coronavirus-mississippi-church-fire-graffiti-holly-springs [https://perma.cc/D785-ZMWF].
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Such was the peculiar reality in the spring of 2020, when all levels and
branches of government faced the astronomical challenge of combating the
COVID-19 pandemic. The lethal and highly contagious virus swept swiftly
and relentlessly across the globe. After the first COVID-19 death in the
United States on February 29, the country began implementing gathering
restrictions throughout the nation to limit the spread of the airborne virus.5
Like most other gatherings, in-person religious worship gatherings were
generally prohibited, raising significant questions about the constitutional
right to free exercise of religion. President Donald Trump called for all
houses of worship across the country to be reopened as “essential” to the
nation.6 However, with the nature of the pandemic still relatively unknown,
governors, legislatures, and the courts were reluctant to open establishments
other than those directly contributing to combating the spread of the virus.
As COVID-19 infection rates began stabilizing, and with mounting pressure
to reopen businesses, governors began implementing phases that determined
when, how, and to what extent businesses could reopen.
The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment7 has posed a challenge
to courts faced with conflicts between religion and the government. Selective
categorization of gatherings amidst reopening efforts has raised significant
free exercise discrimination issues, predominantly regarding whether the
state action in question satisfies the requirement of “general applicability.”
The U.S. Supreme Court’s controversial decision in Employment Division,
Department of Human Resources v. Smith8 established the current standard
for evaluating such predicaments. Writing for the majority, Justice Antonin
Scalia declared that burdens on religious exercise will be upheld so long as
the state law or action is neutral and generally applicable.9 Justice Scalia
offered an “across-the-board criminal prohibition”10 as an example of a
neutral and generally applicable law but did not provide further guidance on
discerning the “infinity of hard cases” involving state actions that are not as
extreme.11
Post-Smith free exercise jurisprudence has met its most significant
challenge during the COVID-19 pandemic. Such a pandemic presents the
5. Derrick Bryson Taylor, A Timeline of the Coronavirus Pandemic, N.Y. TIMES (Jan.
10, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/article/coronavirus-timeline.html [https://perma.cc/
SWE5-ZSQ8]. In April, reports emerged that the earliest deaths attributable to COVID-19
actually occurred in early February. See Stephanie Soucheray, Coroner: First US COVID-19
Death Occurred in Early February, CIDRAP (Apr. 22, 2020), https://www.cidrap.umn.edu/
news-perspective/2020/04/coroner-first-us-covid-19-death-occurred-early-february [https://
perma.cc/NKA6-NJZ2].
6. Marisa Schultz, Trump Announces that Houses of Worship Are “Essential,” Calls on
Governors to Open Them Up, FOX NEWS (May 22, 2020), https://www.foxnews.com/politics/
trump-announces-that-houses-of-worship-are-essential-calls-on-governors-to-open-them-up
[https://perma.cc/8R3G-ZXEE].
7. U.S. CONST. amend. I, cl. 2.
8. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
9. See id. at 878–79.
10. Id. at 884.
11. Richard F. Duncan, Free Exercise Is Dead, Long Live Free Exercise: Smith, Lukumi
and the General Applicability Requirement, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 850, 859 (2001).
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unique opportunity to examine the varied responses between states
advocating for a higher standard of scrutiny and those following Smith. Can
the controversial Smith and the rational basis test truly endure during a
pandemic affecting virtually every corner of society? Or, will the pandemic
finally prove the critics correct and highlight the need to subject all burdens
on religious liberty to a higher standard of scrutiny?
This Note sides with the latter view and advances two main arguments.
First, this Note denounces the inconsistent application of Smith in COVID19 religious exemption cases and calls on the Court to clarify the general
applicability standard when upholding burdens on free exercise. Second, this
Note argues that religious freedoms deserve distinctive treatment through a
narrow application of strict scrutiny. This Note endorses the strict scrutiny
test as “a workable test for striking sensible balances” between religious
freedoms and competing state interests, without impairing the compelling
public health crisis.12 For purposes of this Note, the scope of religious
contexts primarily will focus on Christian denominations from which the
significant majority of COVID-19 religious exemption cases arise.13
Part I provides the relevant contexts for the pandemic, its impact on
religious worship, and the development of free exercise jurisprudence. Part
II discusses the religious exemption cases during COVID-19 and highlights
the unguided and inconsistent application of the general applicability
standard. Specifically, this part argues that courts must carefully discern
which gatherings are comparable and, to do so, the Supreme Court must step
in to provide clearer guidance for courts in discerning general applicability.
Part III argues that free exercise of religion deserves distinctive treatment.
Thus, if Smith is overruled, courts should carefully apply a heightened strict
scrutiny standard for religious exemption cases.
I. COVID-19 AND THE COURT’S FREE EXERCISE JURISPRUDENCE
This part concerns the interaction of three distinct topics. Part I.A
describes events and considerations surrounding the COVID-19 pandemic.
Part I.B discusses the impact of the pandemic on religion. Part I.C provides
an overview of free exercise jurisprudence as it stands today.
A. COVID-19 Pandemic
On December 31, 2019, the World Health Organization (WHO) became
aware of flu-like symptoms spreading in Wuhan City, China.14 In early
January 2020, shortly before the first reported death, health officials
12. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(5).
13. It is important to note that cases involving gathering restrictions placed on Jewish
synagogues have also played a significant role in free exercise jurisprudence during the
pandemic. See generally Roman Cath. Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. 63 (2020)
(per curiam); Soos v. Cuomo, 470 F. Supp. 3d 268 (N.D.N.Y. 2020).
14. See Timeline: WHO’s COVID-19 Response, WORLD HEALTH ORG., https://www.who.
int/emergencies/diseases/novel-coronavirus-2019/interactive-timeline
[https://perma.cc/
D6J3-S4XR] (last visited Jan. 27, 2021).
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determined the cause was a new coronavirus.15 On January 21, WHO
confirmed the human-to-human transmission of the virus, with Thailand,
South Korea, Japan, and the United States confirming their first cases.16
Through the rest of January and February, the virus spread through Asia,
Europe, North America, and South America.17 On February 29, the Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) confirmed the first death in the
United States.18
As of early March, the virus was still relatively unknown, with scientific
and political opinion sharply divided on how best to combat the virus;
medical organizations debated the effectiveness of social distancing
protocols and personal protective equipment (PPE).19 Nonetheless, as of
March 17, over 5000 were infected, with nearly one hundred casualties.20
The next day, California issued the nation’s first statewide stay-at-home
order,21 urging all nonessential workers to stay home. Within the week,
Illinois, New York, and Michigan declared their own statewide orders.22
Following President Trump’s declaration of COVID-19 as a public health
emergency, between March 1 and May 31, forty-two states implemented
gathering restrictions to some extent, with the most severely affected states,
such as New York and New Jersey, implementing stricter directives.23
In mid-May, some southern and western states began to roll back their
stay-at-home orders, allowing businesses such as gyms, hair and nail salons,
and restaurants to reopen pursuant to health and safety measures.24 Other
states—as well as health officials—expressed concern for reopening the

15. Id.
16. See id; see also Statement on the First Meeting of the International Health Regulations
(2005) Emergency Committee Regarding the Outbreak of Novel Coronavirus (2019-nCoV),
WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Jan. 23, 2020), https://www.who.int/news/item/23-01-2020-statementon-the-meeting-of-the-international-health-regulations-(2005)-emergency-committeeregarding-the-outbreak-of-novel-coronavirus-(2019-ncov) [https://perma.cc/UNE8-W4W4].
17. Id.
18. Emma Newburger, Washington State Confirms First US Death from Coronavirus,
CNBC (Feb. 29, 2020, 5:19 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/02/29/washington-stateconfirms-first-us-death-from-coronavirus.html [https://perma.cc/58U8-WU4E].
19. German Lopez, The Evidence for Everyone Wearing Masks, Explained, VOX (Apr. 4,
2020),
https://www.vox.com/2020/3/31/21198132/coronavirus-covid-face-masks-n95respirator-ppe-shortage [https://perma.cc/C2QC-CXQN]; see also Tina Hesman Saey, Why 6
Feet May Not Be Enough Social Distance to Avoid COVID-19, SCIENCENEWS (Apr. 17, 2020,
6:00 AM), https://www.sciencenews.org/article/coronavirus-covid-19-why-6-feet-may-notbe-enough-social-distance [https://perma.cc/BA2M-BHCU].
20. See supra note 14.
21. Phil Helsel, California Issues Statewide Stay-at-Home Order in Coronavirus Fight,
NBC NEWS (Mar. 19, 2020, 10:29 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/californiaissues-statewide-stay-home-order-coronavirus-fight-n1164471
[https://perma.cc/SM29YQWE].
22. See Coronavirus Restrictions and Mask Mandates for All 50 States, N.Y. TIMES (Jan.
29, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/us/states-reopen-map-coronavirus.html
[https://perma.cc/3CQA-RH28].
23. See Proclamation No. 9994, 85 Fed. Reg. 15,337 (Mar. 13, 2020).
24. See supra note 22.
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economy too prematurely.25 During the summer months, the southern and
western states—particularly those that partially reopened their economies—
experienced a surge in cases, leading to the reinstatement of some stay-athome orders.26 Other states continued reopening efforts, implementing
social distancing and PPE measures to reduce the spread of the virus.27
As of February 4, 2021, WHO had confirmed over 26 million cases and
over 452,000 deaths in the United States and 100 million cases and 2.29
million deaths worldwide.28
B. The Pandemic’s Impact on Religion in the United States
In Washington State, a 122-member choir normally gathers every Tuesday
evening at Mount Vernon Presbyterian Church for two-and-a-half-hour
rehearsals.29 On March 15, 2020, the choir director notified the choir that six
members had begun experiencing fevers, and by March 17, twenty-four
members reported flu-like symptoms and at least three positive COVID-19
test results.30 In total, fifty-three members were affected, and two members
ultimately died from the virus.31
This event is noted as one of the earliest “super-spreader” events during
the COVID-19 pandemic.32 Such events have drawn considerable attention
to religious worship and its role in spreading the virus. Some have vocalized
the importance of providing spiritual support during a pandemic, while others
have proclaimed that it is “‘not Christian’ to hold in-person services during
a pandemic.”33
Nearly all religious practices and traditions encompass intimate, face-toface interactions. Christian denominations, specifically, generally believe
that their congregations must meet in person each week to worship together
as called on by God, who created humans as physical beings to gather and
worship together.34 Religious rituals, such as the Lord’s Supper, are intimate
and vital acts of the Christian faith that require the physical administering of
25. See Christina Maxouris & Amir Vera, US Is Still “Knee-Deep” in the First Wave of
the Coronavirus Pandemic, Fauci Says, CNN (July 7, 2020, 8:02 AM), https://www.cnn.com/
2020/07/06/health/us-coronavirus-monday/index.html [https://perma.cc/3TUG-T8KN].
26. See id.
27. See id.
28. See WHO Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) Dashboard, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Feb.
1, 2021, 10:19 AM), https://covid19.who.int/table [https://perma.cc/F4LG-FD5T]
29. See Lea Hamner et al., High SARS-CoV-2 Attack Rate Following Exposure at a Choir
Practice—Skagit County, Washington, March 2020, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION (May 15, 2020), https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/69/wr/mm6919e6.htm
[https://perma.cc/VKS6-FXR3].
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. See Maryville Baptist Church, Inc. v. Beshear, 957 F.3d 610, 615 (6th Cir. 2020)
(quoting Doral Chenoweth III, Video: DeWine Says It’s “Not Christian” to Hold Church
During Coronavirus, COLUMBUS DISPATCH (Apr. 1, 2020, 5:00 PM),
https://www.dispatch.com/news/20200401/video-dewine-says-itrsquos-ldquonotchristianrdquo-to-hold-church-during-coronavirus [https://perma.cc/G3QU-ZLXW]).
34. See Acts 20:7; 1 Corinthians 15, 16:2; Genesis 2:7.
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bread and wine as the representation or embodiment of the body and blood
of Jesus Christ.35 Congregational singing is particularly essential to the
Protestant worship experience, as it represents an outpouring of thankfulness
and filling of the heart with the Holy Spirit. The Bible calls on believers to
“sing[] psalms and hymns and spiritual songs.”36 Apostle Paul also teaches
that, through singing, believers shall “[give] thanks always and for
everything to God the Father in the name of our Lord Jesus Christ.”37
Inevitably, the risk of transmission associated with physical contact and
singing have compelled religious worshipers to endure a cautious and
reluctant transition to online worship, drive-in services, and virtual
community groups.38 Furthermore, death and mourning are deeply religious
life events that typically bring people together.39 The pandemic’s increased
death toll, for many, has produced a greater need for religious traditions, yet
social distancing and appropriate health measures continue to prevent the
customary exercise of such traditions.40
As of late 2019, Christianity is the largest religion in the United States,
with approximately 167 million adult Christians in the country.41 However,
nearly one-fifth of regular church attendees are not participating in online
worship services, and the numbers are even greater for those who were
already not regularly attending service.42 Nearly 12 percent of religious
individuals indicated that their primary houses of worship did not provide
alternative virtual solutions, while nearly 5 percent indicated that they were
unsure.43
35. See
Shorter
Catechism,
THE
ORTHODOX
PRESBYTERIAN
CHURCH,
https://www.opc.org/sc.html [https://perma.cc/R36U-K3K7] (last visited Jan. 27, 2021) (“The
Lord’s supper is a sacrament, wherein, by giving and receiving bread and wine according to
Christ’s appointment, his death is showed forth; and the worthy receivers are, not after a
corporal and carnal manner, but by faith, made partakers of his body and blood, with all his
benefits, to their spiritual nourishment and growth in grace.”).
36. Colossians 3:16.
37. Ephesians 5:20.
38. See Hamner et al., supra note 29; see also Rebecca Heilweil, Religious Leaders Are
Becoming Content Creators to Keep Their Followers Engaged, VOX (Sept. 18, 2020, 4:39
PM),
https://www.vox.com/recode/2020/9/18/21443661/religion-logging-off-onlineengagement-content-creators [https://perma.cc/YH5U-W5N7]; Emily McFarlan Miller,
Churches Go Back to the Future with Drive-in Services in the Time of the Coronavirus,
RELIGION NEWS SERV. (Mar. 23, 2020), https://religionnews.com/2020/03/23/churches-goback-to-the-future-with-drive-in-services-in-the-time-of-the-coronavirus/
[https://perma.cc/RNY6-5TZV].
39. See Joseph O. Baker et al., Religion in the Age of Social Distancing: How COVID-19
Presents New Directions for Research, 81 SOCIO. RELIGION 357, 358 (2020).
40. Id.
41. See In U.S., Decline of Christianity Continues at Rapid Pace, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Oct.
17, 2019), https://www.pewforum.org/2019/10/17/in-u-s-decline-of-christianity-continuesat-rapid-pace/ [https://perma.cc/A7VG-ZGDF].
42. See Claire Gecewicz, Few Americans Say Their House of Worship Is Open, but a
Quarter Say Their Faith Has Grown Amid Pandemic, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Apr. 30, 2020),
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/04/30/few-americans-say-their-house-ofworship-is-open-but-a-quarter-say-their-religious-faith-has-grown-amid-pandemic/
[https://perma.cc/UX6D-KYJC].
43. Id.
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Thus, like most other aspects of society, the pandemic has drastically
affected religious worship. Whereas the gravity and nature of the pandemic
has, for some, produced a greater “demand” for religious practices, traditions,
comfort, and support, COVID-19 public health concerns have severely
limited the “supply” of customary religious experiences.44 While some have
embraced this opportunity to assist public health efforts, others have
questioned how to “render to Caesar the things that are Caesar’s, and to God
the things that are God’s.”45
C. Free Exercise Jurisprudence
The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution declares that Congress
“shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof.”46 The second clause is the Free Exercise Clause,
which prohibits government interference with religious beliefs and
practices.47 The most common issue in free exercise jurisprudence arises
when a neutral and generally applicable state law or action has the incidental
effect of interfering with a particular religious practice or belief.48 In
analyzing this issue, the Court has generally raised two inquiries: (1) whether
the law is in fact neutral and generally applicable; and (2) whether the law, if
not neutral and generally applicable, is nevertheless supported by a
compelling and narrowly tailored state interest.49 If neither inquiry is
satisfied, then the state action or law may not exempt religious gatherings
from favorable categorizations.50
The Court established the current law through its ruling in Smith and other
significant developments in 1993. However, the development of this
jurisprudence has been controversial at times. Cases regarding religious
gathering restrictions during COVID-19 often have turned on the question of
general applicability and whether state interests were tailored narrowly
enough to justify the burden on religious gatherings.
1. Early Developments and the Sherbert Test
In addressing free exercise issues, the Supreme Court first distinguished
between religious belief and religious conduct. The Free Exercise Clause
“embraces two concepts,—freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first
is absolute, but in the nature of things, the second cannot be.”51 Whereas the

44. See Baker et al., supra note 39, at 358.
45. Matthew 22:21.
46. U.S. CONST. amend I.
47. Id. cl. 2.
48. See Christopher C. Lund, Religion Is Special Enough, 103 VA. L. REV. 481, 482
(2017) (“With the Free Exercise Clause, the persistently recurring issue has been whether the
government should provide religious exemptions from generally applicable laws.”).
49. See infra Part II.C.4.
50. See infra Part II.C.3.
51. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303–04 (1940).
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freedom to believe is unquestionably protected, the freedom to act on those
beliefs may be subject to regulation by the government.52
The first free exercise of religion case before the Supreme Court, Reynolds
v. United States,53 addressed this distinction. In this 1878 case, a grand jury
indicted George Reynolds, a member of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latterday Saints, for practicing polygamy in violation of a federal statute.54
Reynolds argued that the practice of polygamy was essential to the Mormon
faith.55 However, the Court ultimately deemed the statute constitutional,
concluding that, although the government may not regulate or punish
individuals because of their religious beliefs, it may regulate conduct
motivated by such beliefs.56 The Court justified denying an exemption to the
law for the church by stating that Congress has the ability to “reach actions
which were in violation of social duties or subversive to good order.”57 The
Court further appealed to the concept of equality before the law, stating that
exemptions for religiously motivated conduct that would otherwise be
regulated would place “religious belief superior to the law of the land.”58 On
the other hand, the Court has kept the door “tightly closed against any
governmental regulation of religious beliefs.”59
The Court did not hear a free exercise case again until 1940, in Cantwell
v. Connecticut.60 Here, in striking down a state statute creating a prior
restraint on a Jehovah’s Witness’s free exercise of his religion, the Court
expanded free exercise protections to state and local laws.61 The Court ruled
that the Fourteenth Amendment protection against state action incorporates
the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.62
Together, Reynolds and Cantwell formed the initial scope of free exercise
cases. First, the government may only regulate religious conduct, not
religious belief.63 Second, the Court expanded religious liberty, as protected
by the First Amendment to state and local laws.64 This expanded
understanding of the First Amendment significantly strengthened
individuals’ religious liberty protections under the Constitution. However,
the Court had yet to specify a consistent standard of review or framework for
evaluating such cases and therefore, a series of conflicting decisions
followed.
52. See id. at 304.
53. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
54. Id. at 146.
55. Id. at 161.
56. Id. at 166 (“Laws are made for the government of actions, and while they cannot
interfere with mere religious belief and opinions, they may with practices.”).
57. Id. at 164.
58. See id. at 166–67.
59. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402 (1963). See generally Torcaso v. Watkins, 367
U.S. 488 (1961); Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67 (1953); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319
U.S. 105 (1943).
60. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
61. Id. at 308–11.
62. See id. at 305.
63. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 166.
64. Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 308–11.
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Finally, in the 1963 case of Sherbert v. Verner,65 the Supreme Court
created its first framework for evaluating free exercise claims. Adell
Sherbert, a Seventh-day Adventist, was discharged by her employer due to
her refusal to work on Saturdays, her faith’s Sabbath.66 After failing to obtain
other employment, she filed a claim for unemployment compensation
benefits.67 The South Carolina law at issue deemed individuals to be
ineligible for such benefits if they failed to “accept available suitable work
when offered.”68 The state subsequently denied Sherbert unemployment
benefits, concluding that she had failed to accept suitable employment when
offered, despite its conflict with her religious beliefs.69 The state reasoned
that allowing exemptions to the unemployment compensation laws for
religious individuals would “dilute the unemployment compensation fund”
and “hinder the scheduling by employers of necessary Saturday work.”70
The Supreme Court ultimately ruled in favor of Sherbert and utilized a
two-step analysis.71 First, the Court deliberated on whether the state law
placed any burden on Sherbert’s religious practice.72 The Court emphatically
concluded that such a burden existed, stating that her ineligibility for benefits
derived solely from the practice of her religion and forced her to choose
between following her religion and forfeiting benefits.73 Second, the Court
considered whether the state showed a compelling state interest justifying the
burden on Sherbert’s religious practice.74 To satisfy this standard, the Court
required more than a “merely . . . rational relationship to some colorable state
interest” in such a “highly sensitive constitutional area.”75 In stating that
only “the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interest, give occasion for
permissible limitation,” the Court concluded that the dilution of the
unemployment fund and possible scheduling issues fell short of such a
standard.76 Even if the state could prove a likely increase in fraudulent
claims or scheduling issues, the Court required the government to show that
no alternative methods could “combat such abuses without infringing First
Amendment rights.”77 Thus, the state was required to further justify its
burden on religious belief or practice by showing that the state action was the
least restrictive means for achieving the state interest.

65. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
66. See id. at 399.
67. Id. at 399–400.
68. Id. at 401.
69. See id.
70. See id. at 407.
71. See id. at 402–04.
72. Id. at 403 (“We turn first to the question whether the disqualification for benefits
imposes any burden on the free exercise of appellant’s religion. We think it is clear that it
does.”).
73. Id. at 404.
74. Id. at 406.
75. Id.
76. See id. at 406–07 (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945)).
77. Id. at 407.
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The Court thus established the Sherbert test, which requires the
government to prove that the allegedly infringing law (1) furthers a
compelling state interest and (2) is narrowly tailored to achieve the state
interest.78 If the government succeeds in proving these elements, plaintiffs
must comply with the law regardless of their religious exercises.79 If the
government fails to meet its burden, then plaintiffs are granted an exemption
from the law.80
2. Yoder and the Limited Application of the Sherbert Test
The Court extended the Sherbert test beyond state unemployment
compensation laws and into criminal law in Wisconsin v. Yoder.81 An Amish
family contested a Wisconsin criminal statute that imposed sanctions on
parents whose children did not attend school through the age of sixteen.82
The family claimed that this conflicted with the Amish religion, which
required them to be insulated from “worldly influence” and to be trained in
the self-reliant, agrarian community during their formative years.83 The state
responded that the compulsory education was intended to develop a
productive, self-reliant citizenry.84
The Supreme Court, applying the Sherbert test, concluded that nothing in
the record showed that the state interest in public education outweighed the
“grave interference” with Amish belief and practices.85 The Court
additionally held that the state could still achieve its interest in a productive
citizenry by requiring education only through age fourteen, eliminating the
burden to the Amish community’s right to freely exercise its religion while
still serving the state’s interest.86 Because the state failed to show that
compulsory education was the least restrictive means to achieve its
compelling interest, the Court concluded that the Amish were
constitutionally entitled to an exemption from the law.87
Despite its application and expansion in Yoder, the Court applied the
Sherbert test in only three other unemployment benefits cases from 1972 to
1990.88 These three cases—along with Sherbert—became known as the
“Sherbert Quartet.”89 In Thomas v. Review Board of the Indiana

78. Id. at 403.
79. See id.
80. See id.
81. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
82. Id. at 207–09.
83. Id. at 210.
84. Id. at 221.
85. Id. at 218.
86. Id. at 222.
87. See id. at 218, 234.
88. Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1109, 1110, 1120 (1990) (referring to Yoder as the “last major free exercise
victory”).
89. Prabha Sipi Bhandari, Note, The Failure of Equal Regard to Explain the Sherbert
Quartet, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 97, 97 (1997).
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Employment Security Division,90 Eddie Thomas refused his employer’s
request to transfer him from a manufacturing department to an industrial
department that produced military equipment.91 Thomas reasoned that the
industrial work conflicted with his pacifist religious beliefs as a Jehovah’s
Witness.92 Thomas subsequently quit and was denied unemployment
benefits.93 Ruling in favor of Thomas, the Court stated that “only those
interests of the highest order . . . can overbalance legitimate claims to the free
exercise of religion.”94 The Court arrived at similar conclusions in Hobbie
v. Unemployment Appeals Commission,95 ruling that a state could not deny
unemployment benefits to a Seventh-day Adventist who was fired for
refusing to work on the Sabbath.96 The Court added that it made no
difference that the employee adopted certain religious practices after
employment began; it is nonetheless an impermissible burden to compel
employees to modify their religious practices to qualify for unemployment
benefits.97 In Frazee v. Illinois Department of Income Security,98 the Court
similarly ruled that a state may not deny unemployment benefits due to a
person’s refusal to work on the Sabbath, even if that person holds a sincere
belief independent of membership in any established religion.99
Beyond the Sherbert quartet and Yoder, the Court rejected every claim
requesting exemption from burdensome laws.100 The Sherbert test came
under increasing scrutiny in the 1980s, and the Court began narrowing the
concept of “significant burden” while more readily labeling state interests as
“compelling” where religious practice was significantly burdened. For
example, in Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n,101 the
Court reversed a lower court injunction prohibiting the U.S. Forest Service
from building a roadway based on the rationale that it would damage grounds
historically used by Native Americans for religious rituals.102 The Court
reasoned that the impact on religious practice was incidental—as opposed to
an explicit prohibition of such practice—and thus did not require the
government to bring forward a compelling justification.103 In United States
v. Lee,104 the Court denied an exemption for an Amish employer who refused
to pay social security tax, stating that “it would be difficult to
accommodate . . . myriad exceptions flowing from a wide variety of religious
90. 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
91. See id. at 709.
92. See id. at 710–11.
93. See id. at 710–12.
94. See id. at 718 (alteration in original) (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215
(1972)).
95. 480 U.S. 136 (1987).
96. See id. at 139–42.
97. See id. at 143–44.
98. 489 U.S. 829 (1989).
99. See id. at 834–35.
100. See McConnell, supra note 88, at 1110.
101. 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
102. Id. at 458.
103. Id. at 450–51.
104. 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
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beliefs.”105 Surveying the application of the test, one commentator criticized
the test as “more talk than substance,” referring to the Court’s reluctance to
side with free exercise claimants.106 Others noted that the test was “strict in
theory but feeble in fact.”107
Thus, through the 1980s, the Court loosened the standard set by Sherbert,
marking an extensive period of religious exemption denials. This period
eventually culminated in the Court’s full departure from strict scrutiny in its
1990 decision in Smith.
3. The Smith Requirements: Neutrality and General Applicability
In Smith, two Native Americans, Alfred Smith and Galen Black, were
terminated from their counselor positions at a drug rehabilitation clinic for
ingesting a hallucinogenic substance called peyote.108 The claimants
ingested the substance for sacramental purposes at a Native American
Church ceremony.109 Upon denial of unemployment compensation benefits,
Smith and Black filed suit claiming that such denial was a violation of their
right to free exercise of religion.110
The Court ultimately refused to grant an exception to the claimants.111
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia first distinguished prior free exercise
cases granting exemptions to claimants, stating that those cases were limited
to unemployment compensation matters that were particularly suited for
applying exemptions.112 Specifically, Justice Scalia distinguished the
Sherbert line of cases, reasoning that those cases “stand for the proposition
that where the State has in place a system of individual exemptions,” the state
may not refuse to incorporate cases of religious hardship without a
compelling reason.113 In other words, unemployment compensation
programs already involve examination of individual circumstances to
evaluate for possible exemptions.114 This is distinguishable from an “acrossthe-board criminal prohibition on a particular form of conduct,” such as the
use of peyote.115

105. See id. at 253 (distinguishing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)).
106. See McConnell, supra note 88, at 1109.
107. Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, The Vulnerability of Conscience: The
Constitutional Basis for Protecting Religious Conduct, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1245, 1247 (1994).
Notably, Professors Christopher L. Eisgruber and Lawrence G. Sager argued that the Sherbert
test was not suited for religious exemption cases in general. However, in cases involving
administrative systems evaluating individuals on a case-by-case basis, such as those in the
Sherbert quartet, Eisgruber and Sager argued that a refusal of benefits on religious grounds
“represent[ed] a failure of equal regard” as compared to benefits granted for those who quit
their jobs for secular reasons, such as family or health. See id. at 1287.
108. Emp. Div., Dep’t of Hum. Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 874 (1990).
109. Id.
110. See id. at 872.
111. Id. at 890.
112. Id. at 884.
113. Id. (citing Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 708 (1986) (plurality opinion)).
114. Id.
115. Id.
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Additionally, Justice Scalia controversially distinguished prior cases
upholding exemptions, including Yoder, as “hybrid”116 cases that involved
“not the Free Exercise Clause alone, but . . . other constitutional protections,”
such as free speech or parental rights.117 The Court reasoned that because
such cases involved other constitutional rights, they were not applicable to
Smith in this case.118 Because the facts in this case did not present “such a
hybrid situation,” the Court did not apply similar constitutional protections
as those granted in Yoder.119
In so ruling, the Court abandoned the compelling state interest test from
Sherbert, deemed to be “courting anarchy” due to the diversity of religious
beliefs in the United States.120 Instead, the Court held that religious beliefs
may not be grounds for exemption when concerned with “valid and neutral
law[s] of general applicability.”121 A state could justify a law with incidental
burdens on religious practice so long as the law was neutral and generally
applicable.122
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, though concurring in the judgment,
disagreed with the Court’s abandonment of the compelling state interest
standard.123 The First Amendment, Justice O’Connor stated, “does not
distinguish between laws that are generally applicable and laws that target
particular religious practices.”124 Although Justice Scalia and the majority
held that generally applicable laws are “one large step” removed from laws
regulating specific religious practices,125 Justice O’Connor contended that
the First Amendment “ought not be construed to cover only the extreme and
hypothetical situation in which a State directly targets a religious
practice.”126 Furthermore, Justice O’Connor pointed out that the Court’s
protection of generally applicable laws entailed explicitly overruling Yoder,
where the Court acknowledged areas of conduct protected by the Free
Exercise Clause “beyond the power of the State to control, even under

116. Id. at 882.
117. Id. at 881 (“The only decisions in which we have held that the First Amendment bars
application of a neutral, generally applicable law to religiously motivated action have involved
not the Free Exercise Clause alone, but the Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with other
constitutional protections . . . .”).
118. Id.
119. Id. at 882 (stating that the facts of the case show “a free exercise claim unconnected
with any communicative activity or parental right”).
120. Id. at 888 (stating that applying the Sherbert test “would open the prospect of
constitutionally required religious exemptions from civic obligations of almost every
conceivable kind”).
121. Id. at 879 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in judgment)).
122. Id. at 878 (“[I]f prohibiting the exercise of religion (or burdening the activity of
printing) is not the object of the tax but merely the incidental effect of a generally applicable
and otherwise valid provision, the First Amendment has not been offended.”).
123. Id. at 892 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
124. Id. at 894.
125. Id. at 878 (majority opinion).
126. Id. at 894 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
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regulations of general applicability.”127 In effect, Justice O’Connor believed
that the Smith requirements of neutrality and general applicability are
“merely evidence of a legitimate state interest, not reasons to change the
standard for evaluating that interest.”128
Justice Harry Blackmun, in his dissent, similarly expressed concern for the
Court’s overruling a “settled and inviolate principle of this Court’s First
Amendment jurisprudence.”129 He first clarified that the state interest
involved is not the “broad interest in fighting the critical ‘war on drugs’” but
the “State’s narrow interest in refusing to make an exception for the religious,
ceremonial use of peyote.”130 Following the evidentiary reasoning in Yoder
and Thomas, Justice Blackmun undermined the state’s alleged compelling
interest, stating that Oregon had never enforced a peyote prohibition nor was
there any evidence that peyote “has ever harmed anyone.”131 Additionally,
Justice Blackmun described the majority’s assertion that granting an
exemption would cause “a flood of other claims to religious exemptions” as
“purely speculative” and inconsistent with prior cases granting exemptions
in the face of similarly speculative arguments.132
Smith remains a highly controversial case. Some have vehemently
supported the decision, claiming that religious exemptions create “a
constitutional preference for religious over non-religious belief systems”133
that unfairly “insulate[s] religious beliefs from social forces,” while
“competing secular beliefs . . . must stand or fall on their own accord.”134
Others found the decision “troubling, bordering on the shocking,”135 arguing
that the First Amendment “treats religious belief differently—sometimes
127. Id. at 896 (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 220 (1972)). Justice O’Connor
also extracted language from Yoder contradicting the Court’s opinion on neutrality. Id. (“A
regulation neutral on its face may, in its application, nonetheless offend the constitutional
requirement for government neutrality if it unduly burdens the free exercise of religion.”
(quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 220 (1972))).
128. David Bogen, Generally Applicable Laws and the First Amendment, 26 SW. U. L.
REV. 201, 211–12 (1996).
129. Smith, 494 U.S. at 908 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
130. Id. at 909–10. Justice Blackmun also cites Yoder. Id. at 910 (“‘Where fundamental
claims of religious freedom are at stake,’ the Court will not accept a State’s ‘sweeping claim’
that its interest in compulsory education is compelling; despite the validity of this interest ‘in
the generality of cases, we must searchingly examine the interests that the State seeks to
promote . . . and the impediment to those objectives that would flow from recognizing the
claimed Amish exemption.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S.
205, 221 (1972))).
131. Id. at 911–12 (“[T]his Court’s prior decisions have not allowed a government to rely
on mere speculation about potential harms, but have demanded evidentiary support for a
refusal to allow a religious exception.”); see also Thomas v. Rev. Bd. of the Ind. Emp. Sec.
Div., 450 U.S. 707, 719 (1981).
132. Smith, 494 U.S. at 916–17 (Blackman, J., dissenting).
133. William P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith and Free Exercise Revisionism, 58 U. CHI.
L. REV. 308, 319 (1991).
134. Id. at 322; see also Philip B. Kurland, Of Church and State and the Supreme Court,
29 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 7 (1961); Mark Tushnet, Of Church and State and the Supreme Court:
Kurland Revisited, 1989 SUP. CT. REV. 373, 390 (asserting that granting religious exemptions
amounted to government favoritism of religion that raised serious constitutional concerns).
135. See McConnell, supra note 88, at 1120.
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better, sometimes worse” and echoing the sentiments of Justice O’Connor
and Justice Blackmun.136
4. Lukumi: Neutrality and General Applicability Defined
During the three years following Smith, an onslaught of free exercise cases
decided against religious groups culminated in the Supreme Court’s decision
in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah.137 This case
involved a Santeria church that engaged in animal sacrifice as a central form
of devotion.138 The City of Hialeah attempted to prohibit such a religious
practice through ordinances with the intent of “protecting the public health
and preventing cruelty to animals.”139 In its decision, the Court applied the
general propositions from Smith—that a law that is neutral and of general
applicability “need not be justified by a compelling governmental interest
even if the law has the incidental effect of burdening a particular religious
practice.”140 A law is not neutral and generally applicable must then be
justified by a compelling state interest and must be narrowly tailored to
advance that interest.141
First, unlike its view of the prohibition of peyote in Smith, the Court found
the ordinances prohibiting animal sacrifice to be neither neutral nor generally
applicable.142 In analyzing neutrality, the Court weighed the object of the
city ordinances against the burden on the Santeria church’s religious
practices.143 In doing so, the Court ultimately found sufficient evidence—
particularly in the legislative history of the ordinances—of improper
targeting of the Santeria church and thus, concluded that the object of the
ordinances was to suppress religion.144 In particular, the Court concluded
that the broad ordinances prohibited the Santeria church’s practice of animal
sacrifice even when it did not threaten the city’s interest in public health.145
The ordinances “gerrymandered with care to proscribe religious killings of
animals but to exclude almost all secular killings” thus “target[ing]” the
Santeria church.146
Next, the Court held that the ordinances were not generally applicable.147
Although Justice Anthony Kennedy declined to “define with precision the
136. See Michael W. McConnell, A Response to Professor Marshall, 58 U. CHI. L. REV.
329, 331 (1991); see also Abner S. Greene, The Political Balance of the Religion Clauses, 102
YALE L.J. 1611, 1643 (1992) (“[T]he Court in Employment Division v. Smith lumped religious
values together with secular ones and permitted no conscience to trump the political process,
to become ‘a law unto itself.’” (quoting Smith, 494 U.S. at 890)).
137. 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
138. Id. at 524.
139. Id. at 543.
140. Id. at 531.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 546.
143. Id. at 533–34.
144. Id. at 541–42.
145. Id. at 538–39.
146. Id. at 542.
147. Id. at 543.
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standard used to evaluate” general applicability, he nevertheless concluded
that Hialeah’s ordinances fell “well below the minimum standard necessary
to protect First Amendment rights.”148 Notably, Justice Kennedy examined
the ordinances’ inclusivity, evaluating whether similar, nonreligious conduct
was also subjected to similar prohibitions.149 The Court ultimately
concluded that the ordinances were underinclusive because they failed to
prohibit “nonreligious conduct that endangers these interests in a similar or
greater degree than Santeria sacrifice does.”150 For example, the Court cited
fishing, extermination of mice, and the hunting of hogs as examples of
nonreligious conduct that nevertheless were not prohibited by the city
ordinances.151 Additionally, the Court pointed out that the city failed to
regulate actors who improperly disposed of carcasses, such as hunters or
restaurants, but only found an issue when it “results from religious
exercise.”152 In sum, the Court concluded that only conduct specific to the
Santeria church was subjected to the ordinances and thus the ordinances were
not generally applicable.153
After determining that the ordinances were discriminatory, the Court
examined whether they were nevertheless justified by a compelling state
interest and if they were narrowly tailored to achieve such an interest.
Drawing from the Smith requirement analysis, the Court concluded that the
ordinances were “overbroad or underinclusive in substantial respects” to
justify its alleged state interests.154
The Court reasoned that the
government’s failure to restrict similar secular conduct, while also limiting
conduct protected by the First Amendment, is an indication that the “interest
given in justification of the restriction is not compelling.”155 Thus, Lukumi
applied the tenets of Smith by first discerning neutrality and general
applicability, then on a finding of discrimination, further examined the case
under strict scrutiny.
Although Smith established neutrality and general applicability as the main
requirements for discerning religious exemption cases, Lukumi elaborated
and established the framework for evaluating these requirements. Despite
Justice Kennedy’s reluctance to define a particular standard for discerning
either neutrality or general applicability, he nevertheless provided ample
guidelines for analysis.156

148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 543–44.
152. Id. at 545.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 546.
155. Id. at 546–47. Justice Kennedy further stated that, “[i]t is established in our strict
scrutiny jurisprudence that ‘a law cannot be regarded as protecting an interest of the highest
order . . . when it leaves appreciable damage to that supposedly vital interest unprohibited.’”
Id. at 547 (alteration in original) (quoting Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 541–42 (1989)
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)).
156. See id. at 543.
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Neutrality is determined by the object of the law, and general applicability
involves categories of selection.157 Essentially, any law affecting religion
must use the proper means (general applicability) to achieve a proper end
(neutrality).158 In analyzing neutrality, the breadth of the state action or law
is examined to see if its burden on religious exercise is necessary to satisfy
the state interest; if the burden is not necessary, then the law is deemed
nonneutral.159 In other words, neutrality examines whether the state action
or law targets a specific religion or religion generally. General applicability
analysis discerns inclusiveness; if religious exercise is burdened while
similarly situated secular practices are not, then the law is deemed
underinclusive and thus not generally applicable.160 In this manner,
neutrality is a necessary component of a law of general applicability, and a
“failure to satisfy one requirement is a likely indication that the other has not
been satisfied.”161
For example, the prohibition of peyote in Smith was deemed neutral by the
Court because the object of the law—to abolish drug trafficking and protect
the health and safety of citizens—required necessary participation from both
religious and nonreligious citizens.162 In other words, to create exemptions
for religious use of peyote would frustrate the state’s ability to curb the use
of harmful substances. The prohibition was deemed generally applicable
because similarly situated secular conduct—in fact, all uses of peyote—were
subjected to the same prohibition.
The across-the-board prohibition of peyote is distinguishable from the
ordinances in Lukumi that were found to limit slaughtering of animals only
when undertaken by the Santeria church, while permitting other forms of
slaughter without similar regulations.163 Justice Kennedy emphasized that
although “[a]ll laws are selective to some extent . . . categories of selection
are of paramount concern” when religious exercise is burdened.164 By
limiting slaughtering for religious purposes but not for other similar secular
purposes, the Hialeah ordinances failed to meet the standards of general
applicability.165

157. See Bogen, supra note 128, at 208.
158. See id. at 208–09.
159. See id. at 209.
160. See id. at 208–09.
161. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 531.
162. Emp. Div., Dep’t of Hum. Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 911 (1990).
163. Douglas Laycock & Steven T. Collis, Generally Applicable Law and the Free
Exercise of Religion, 95 NEB. L. REV. 1, 5 (2016).
164. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 542. Justice Kennedy further elaborated that “[t]he principle that
government, in pursuit of legitimate interests, cannot in a selective manner impose burdens
only on conduct motivated by religious belief is essential to the protection of the rights
guaranteed by the Free Exercise Clause.” Id. at 543.
165. See id. at 543–44.
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5. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993
In the aftermath of Smith, religious and civil liberties groups banded
together to draft and support the passage of the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act of 1993166 (RFRA). Passing with overwhelming support in
both chambers of Congress, the RFRA was signed into law on November 17,
1993, by President Bill Clinton. The RFRA reestablished the Sherbert test
as the default standard for evaluating free exercise claims, “guarantee[ing]
its application in all cases where free exercise of religion is substantially
burdened.”167 Specifically, the law expressly provided that a government
“shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion even if the
burden results from a rule of general applicability,” directly challenging
Smith.168 Only when supported by a compelling state interest that is narrowly
tailored to further that interest may the government place any burden on
religious practices.169
However, the Supreme Court’s ruling in City of Boerne v. Flores170 in
1997 diminished the RFRA significantly. The Court ruled the RFRA
unconstitutional as applied to the states, as it was beyond congressional
authority to compel states to provide greater protection of religious liberty
than the First Amendment.171 The Court stated that the law was “a
considerable congressional intrusion into the States’ traditional
prerogatives”172 and “contradict[ed] vital principles necessary to maintain
separation of powers and the federal balance.”173
Despite this setback, the Supreme Court has continued to uphold
applications of the RFRA to the federal government without addressing
constitutional questions. In Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao
Do Vegetal,174 the U.S. Customs Services’s seizure of hoasca—a tea used by
the respondent-church for communion purposes—was held unjustified under
the RFRA because the government failed to show a sufficient compelling
state interest.175 Notably, Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the majority,
echoed the reasoning in Yoder that the compelling interest test is satisfied
166. Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5
and 42 U.S.C.).
167. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1).
168. Id. § 2000bb-1(a).
169. Id. § 2000bb-1(b).
170. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
171. Id. at 531–32.
172. Id. at 534.
173. Id. at 536. Specifically, Congress attempted to use Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment to enforce the RFRA against the states. However, Justice Kennedy expressed
that “[t]he Amendment’s design and § 5’s text are inconsistent with any suggestion that
Congress has the power to decree the substance of the Amendment’s restrictions on the
States.” Id. at 508. Justice Kennedy continued that “[l]egislation which alters the meaning of
the Free Exercise Clause cannot be said to be enforcing the Clause” and Congress has the
power to merely enforce and “not the power to determine what constitutes a constitutional
violation.” Id. at 519.
174. 546 U.S. 418 (2006).
175. See id. at 423.
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through “application of the challenged law ‘to the person’—the particular
claimant whose sincere exercise of religion is being substantially
burdened.”176 In narrowing the scope of inquiry under the RFRA to the
particular exemption in question, the Court found the compelling state
interest to be unfounded and concluded that “there is no indication that
Congress . . . considered the harms posed by . . . the sacramental use of
hoasca by the [church].”177
In the more recent Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.,178 the Court again
upheld an exemption for religious liberty claimants. Here, corporate owners
contested a Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) mandate
requiring them to provide coverage for contraceptive services when issuing
health insurance plans to employees.179 The owners held that providing
contraceptive coverage conflicted with their sincere religious beliefs.180 The
Court ultimately ruled that the corporate owners should be exempted, holding
that HHS failed to satisfy the RFRA’s least-restrictive-means standard and
failed to show that “it lacks other means of achieving its desired goal without
imposing a substantial burden on the exercise of religion.”181
Some states have extended the protections of the federal RFRA, either by
passing state equivalents or by construing state constitutions to adopt strict
scrutiny.182 State supreme courts that have rejected Smith and opted for the
strict scrutiny test often compare the text of their state constitutions to that of
the Free Exercise Clause. In State v. Hershberger,183 the Minnesota Supreme
Court declared that the Minnesota Constitution’s free exercise provision
provides “greater protection for religious liberties against governmental
action . . . than under the first amendment of the federal constitution.”184 The
court subsequently applied the strict scrutiny test and granted exemptions to
the claimants.185 In First Covenant Church v. City of Seattle,186 the
Washington State Supreme Court similarly ruled that the Washington
Constitution was “stronger than the federal constitution” in protecting
176. Id. at 420 (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972)). Chief Justice
Roberts stated, “despite its admitted validity in the generality of cases, we must searchingly
examine the interests that the State seeks to promote . . . and the impediment to those
objectives that would flow from recognizing the claimed Amish exemption.” Id. at 431
(alteration in original) (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213, 221 (1972)). Chief
Justice Roberts further noted, “[t]he Court explained that the State needed ‘to show with more
particularity how its admittedly strong interest . . . would be adversely affected by granting an
exemption to the Amish.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S.
205, 236 (1972)).
177. Id. at 432.
178. 573 U.S. 682 (2014).
179. Id. at 689–90.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 728.
182. See Paul Benjamin Linton, Religious Freedom Claims and Defenses Under State
Constitutions, 7 U. ST. THOMAS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 103, 186 (2013) (listing Alaska, Indiana,
Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New York, Ohio, Washington, and Wisconsin).
183. 462 N.W.2d 393 (Minn. 1990).
184. Id. at 397.
185. Id. at 399.
186. 840 P.2d 174 (Wash. 1992).
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conduct that “merely ‘disturbs’ another on the basis of religion.”187 In
Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Commission,188 the Alaska Supreme
Court similarly rejected Smith and adopted strict scrutiny, reasoning that
Alaska is under no obligation to emulate the U.S. Supreme Court in
evaluating religious exemption cases.189 Other notable rulings were made in
Massachusetts and Vermont.190
Today, in addition to the federal RFRA, twenty-one states have passed
their own versions of the law, mandating that the state may burden the free
exercise of religion only when in furtherance of a compelling state interest
and via the least restrictive means.191 An additional ten states have religious
freedom protections in place via state court decisions.
6. Current Law
Smith stands as the default standard today. So long as a state law is neutral
and generally applicable, a state may refuse to grant a religious exemption
even to substantially burdened religious practice, so long as it has a rational
basis for doing so. As detailed in Lukumi, a law is neutral if the object of the
law is not to burden religious liberty. A law is generally applicable if it is
fully inclusive of all similarly situated conduct––both secular and religious.
A law found not neutral or not generally applicable faces the Sherbert strict
scrutiny test.
II. THE FAILURE OF GENERAL APPLICABILITY IN COVID-19 ORDERS
In evaluating COVID-19 restriction cases, courts generally agree on
several points. First, there is little controversy concerning the neutrality
requirement under Smith; courts largely agree that gathering restrictions
under state executive orders are not motivated by animus toward people of
faith and are not attempts to single out faith-based practices for disfavored
treatment.192 Second, courts do not contest that the orders burden sincere
faith practices.193 Third, courts generally presume that executive orders
187. Id. at 186.
188. 874 P.2d 274 (Alaska 1994).
189. Id. at 280–81.
190. See Att’y Gen. v. Desilets, 636 N.E.2d 233, 236 (Mass. 1994) (stating that the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court “prefer[red] to adhere to the standards of earlier First
Amendment jurisprudence,” specifically noting that the court had previously used “the
balancing test that the Supreme Court had established under the free exercise of religion clause
in Wisconsin v. Yoder”); Hunt v. Hunt, 648 A.2d 843, 853 (Vt. 1994) (holding that the
Vermont Constitution “protects religious liberty to the same extent that the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act” does under the U.S. Constitution).
191. State Religious Freedom Restoration Acts, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES
(May
4,
2017),
https://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/state-rfrastatutes.aspx [https://perma.cc/HL9Q-ET3J].
192. Roberts v. Neace, 958 F.3d 409, 413 (6th Cir. 2020) (“Were the Governor’s orders
motivated by animus toward people of faith? We don’t think so. . . . [W]e don’t think it’s fair
at this point and on this record to say that the orders or their manner of enforcement turn on
faith-based animus.”).
193. See id. at 415 (“No one contests that the orders burden sincere faith practices.”).
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satisfy Smith’s rational basis requirement because they are intended to
combat the spread of COVID-19.194 Lastly, the courts fully acknowledge the
dangers of COVID-19 and have expressed little doubt that governors are
doing their utmost in issuing executive orders to curb the spread of the
virus.195
The primary issue, therefore, lies in the general applicability requirement.
Under Smith and the rational basis test, a finding of general applicability ends
the inquiry and precludes any strict scrutiny analysis.196 However, courts are
left unguided as to how to discern what similarly situated or comparable
gatherings are when evaluating the general applicability of gathering
restrictions.197 Ultimately, the fundamental right to free exercise of religion
has been left vulnerable to inconsistent and, at times, troubling treatment.
Therefore, this part first argues that, under Smith, the general applicability
standard must be clarified to help courts more consistently apply the Smith
analysis. Specifically, the Court should step in and provide guidance on how
to define comparable gatherings. Even so, courts should be more careful in
finding general applicability––either through selected criteria or through
deference to political branches––when fundamental constitutional rights are
involved. Ultimately, such an unprecedented onslaught of religious
exemption cases should prompt courts deepen to their analysis in a way
similar to strict scrutiny rather than finding general applicability along
unguided lines.
Part II.A notes, for comparison purposes, the relatively uncontroversial
court rulings at the onset of stay-at-home orders. Part II.B discusses the
Supreme Court’s attempt to create a framework for religious exemption cases
in South Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom.198 Part II.C surveys the
inconsistency in cases following South Bay that demonstrates the need for
clearer guidance for the courts. Part II.D discusses Calvary Chapel Dayton
Valley v. Sisolak199 and the height of uncertainty for free exercise rights
during the COVID-19. Part II.E discusses the latest Supreme Court order in
Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo,200 which provided
additional perspectives from the Court yet nevertheless failed to clarify
general applicability.
194. See Soos v. Cuomo, 470 F. Supp. 3d 268, 281 (N.D.N.Y. 2020) (“[O]nly rational basis
need be shown, which is self-evident: preventing the spread of COVID-19.”).
195. See Calvary Chapel Dayton Valley v. Sisolak, 140 S. Ct. 2603, 2604–05 (2020)
(mem.) (Alito, J., dissenting) (“States and their subdivisions have responded to the pandemic
by imposing unprecedented restrictions on personal liberty, including the free exercise of
religion. This initial response was understandable. In times of crisis, public officials must
respond quickly and decisively to evolving and uncertain situations. At the dawn of an
emergency—and the opening days of the COVID-19 outbreak plainly qualify—public
officials may not be able to craft precisely tailored rules.”); see also Neace, 958 F.3d at 414
(“We don’t doubt the Governor’s sincerity in trying to do his level best to lessen the spread of
the virus or his authority to protect the Commonwealth’s citizens.”).
196. See supra Part I.C.3.
197. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 543 (1993).
198. 140 S. Ct. 1613 (2020).
199. 140 S. Ct. 2603 (2020) (mem.).
200. 141 S. Ct. 63 (2020) (per curiam).
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A. Initial Stay-at-Home Orders
Cases decided earlier in the pandemic timeline were relatively
uncontroversial. Beginning in March 2020, when the virus was still
relatively unknown, the nation experienced widespread gathering restrictions
with very few exceptions.201 These exceptions were typically limited to
hospitals, essential businesses, and transportation hubs.202 Thus, categories
of establishments were binary—essential or nonessential—with uniform
restrictions applying to the latter. Because gathering restrictions applied
uniformly across most industries, the executive orders were readily deemed
to be generally applicable.
A few claimants nevertheless alleged that allowing secular, essential
businesses to remain open while restricting religious gatherings was a
violation of the free exercise of religion. For example, in Lighthouse
Fellowship Church v. Northam,203 a church claimed that Virginia governor
Ralph Northam’s executive orders were discriminatory because they
restricted religious gatherings to ten individuals while “carv[ing] out broad
exemptions for a host of secular activities,” predominantly those of essential
businesses.204
The Eastern District of Virginia denied the injunction, utilizing the Lukumi
standard of analyzing neutrality and general applicability. First, the court
stated that the orders were neutral because they did “not refer to a religious
practice to single it out for discriminatory treatment.”205 Rather, the orders
“prohibit all social gatherings of more than ten individuals, secular and
religious.”206 Second, the court found general applicability was present
because the orders “are not underinclusive,”207 rebutting the church’s claim
that allowing essential businesses to open is discriminatory against religious
gatherings. The court labeled the exemption for essential businesses as a
“limited carveout [that] does not target religious gatherings,” stating that it
“simply ensures that people have access to essential goods.”208 In response
to the church’s claim that some businesses were misconstrued as essential,
the court provided detailed justifications for opening several businesses,
including electronic equipment stores, liquor stores, and gas station retail
centers.209 The court added that the exemptions for essential businesses were
201. See Coronavirus Restrictions and Mask Mandates for All 50 States, supra note 22.
202. Id.
203. 458 F. Supp. 3d 418 (E.D. Va. 2020).
204. Id. at 429.
205. Id. at 428.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 432.
208. Id. at 430.
209. Id. In defense of electronic equipment businesses, the court stated that “[w]ith more
people working from home, people need access to electronic equipment, to the parts and labor
necessary to repair their electronic devices.” Id. In defense of liquor stores, the court stated
that the “[d]anger posed by sudden alcohol withdrawal to those suffering from alcohol
dependence, and the added burden upon health facilities that [restrictions] might trigger” is
sufficient reasoning to keep liquor stores open. Id. at 431. In defense of gas station retail
centers, the court stated that “at the very least, healthcare professionals and grocery store
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“reasonable” and were carved out for “specific reasons to avoid harms equal
to or greater than the spread of this deadly pandemic.”210 Ultimately,
exemptions for essential businesses were not considered to render the
executive orders discriminatory and thus, the orders were upheld, despite the
burden on religious practices.211
This decision is reasonable. States were effectively shutting down all
operations not directly assisting in the public health efforts or sustaining
remote work. It was wholly understandable for the court to deny an
exemption to a religious organization at a time when all nonessential
gatherings were similarly restricted.212 Even if the court had reviewed under
strict scrutiny, the state would have been likely to prevail due to the
compelling interest of keeping essential hospitals and other businesses open
during the initial uncertain phases of the pandemic. Because the stay-athome orders were applied across the board irrespective of industry or
location, early cases were more akin to the across-the-board prohibition of
peyote in Smith. Therefore, in such contexts, Smith has provided sufficient
guidance on the application of general applicability.
B. Increasing Categorizations Under South Bay
As states began to reopen businesses, restrictions were no longer across
the board but applied on a state-by-state, establishment-by-establishment
basis. Courts could no longer apply the across-the-board reasoning of Smith
but were nevertheless tasked with discerning general applicability by
comparing religious gatherings with the activities of other nonessential
businesses. Free exercise claims increased drastically, with numerous
churches claiming that secular gatherings that posed similar or greater danger
to the states’ public health interests were subjected to more lenient
restrictions. Courts were now faced with the task of discerning general
applicability as required under Smith yet were unguided by any defined
criteria. Spurred by the Supreme Court’s injunctive order in South Bay,
courts were left to discern general applicability along unclear lines.
1. Possible Criteria for Comparison: Proximity and Duration
In South Bay, California governor Gavin Newsom placed a restriction on
25 percent of building capacity or a maximum of one hundred attendees
across all places of worship throughout the state.213 When a church sought
an injunction against these orders, the Court, in a 5-4 decision, denied the

personnel need to get to and from their essential jobs,” thus utilizing gas stations and
purchasing essential goods from its retail centers. Id.
210. Id. at 432.
211. Id.
212. Although certainly related, the full extent of the discussion regarding the essentiality
of religious worship during a public health crisis is beyond the scope of this Note.
213. S. Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 140 S. Ct. 1613, 1613 (2020) (Roberts,
C.J., concurring).
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injunction.214 In his concurring opinion, Chief Justice Roberts primarily
reasoned that because religious gatherings were treated similarly to other
comparable secular gatherings, there was no discrimination.215 Similar or
more severe restrictions were applied to lectures, concerts, movie showings,
spectator sports, and theatrical performances “where large groups of people
gather in close proximity for extended periods of time.”216 More favorable
restrictions were applied to what Chief Justice Roberts labeled as “dissimilar
activities,”217 where people “neither congregate in large groups nor remain
in close proximity for extended periods.”218 The opinion listed grocery
stores, banks, and laundromats as examples of such dissimilar activities.219
Chief Justice Roberts said nothing more regarding the disparate
restrictions. He did not explicitly mention the Smith requirements of
neutrality and general applicability but concluded that the California
guidelines “appear consistent with the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment.”220 Chief Justice Roberts distinguished between gatherings
based on duration and proximity, presumably these criteria were consistent
with California’s interest in curbing the spread of COVID-19.
In contrast, Justice Kavanaugh, in his dissent, provided a more complete
Lukumi analysis.221 First, in his Smith analysis, Justice Kavanaugh provided
a more exhaustive list of businesses not subject to the 25 percent occupancy
cap, including “factories, offices, supermarkets, restaurants, retail stores,
pharmacies, shopping malls, pet grooming shops, bookstores, florists, hair
salons, and cannabis dispensaries.”222 Viewing such establishments as
comparable secular businesses, Justice Kavanaugh described this to be the
“basic constitutional problem” of the case and concluded that “[s]uch
discrimination violates the First Amendment.”223
Having found discrimination, Justice Kavanaugh then evaluated the state
order under strict scrutiny.224 Specifically, Justice Kavanaugh clarified that
the compelling state interest must justify not the state action itself but the
state’s refusal to exempt in-person religious worship.225 Justice Kavanaugh
proposed a more focused and detailed strict scrutiny standard that required a
compelling justification for distinguishing between religious worship
services and comparable secular businesses, which were not subject to the
214. Id.
215. Id. at 1614.
216. Id. at 1613.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 1614 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 1614–15.
225. Id. at 1614. Justice Kavanaugh admits that “California undoubtedly has a compelling
interest in combating the spread of COVID-19 and protecting the health of its citizens.” Id.
However, “restrictions inexplicably applied to one group and exempted from another do little
to further these goals.” Id. (quoting Roberts v. Neace, 958 F.3d 409, 414 (6th Cir. 2020)).
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more restrictive occupancy cap.226 Ultimately, Justice Kavanaugh stated that
California failed to show such a compelling justification for why
establishments such as restaurants and shopping malls were placed under
more lenient state directives while similar leniencies were denied for
churches.227
Justice Kavanaugh then examined whether California’s order was the least
restrictive means of furthering its interest in curbing COVID-19.228 He
concluded that it was not, stating that, despite having “ample options” to
combat the spread of COVID-19, California nevertheless discriminated
against religion.229 These ample options included administering safety
precautions such as social distancing and other health requirements “just as
the Governor has done for comparable secular activities.”230
Both Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kavanaugh provided helpful
starting points for discussion but ultimately raised more questions than
answers. Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion suggested proximity and duration
as possible criteria to discern comparability of gatherings for the general
applicability analysis. Although promising, as Justice Kavanaugh pointed
out, the application of these criteria seems incomplete. Although it is
convincingly clear that people typically gather for longer periods in close
proximity at a church than a bank, it is much less clear when compared to
factories, restaurants, and shopping malls. For example, the concurrence did
not address possibilities, such as gatherings in crowded offices or factory
environments in close proximity and for long hours, or the relative dangers
of restaurant patrons dining and conversing with no masks on. In this light,
Chief Justice Roberts seemingly omitted such entities in his opinion and
instead included only those deemed to be essential businesses in prior
cases.231 In considering the more exhaustive list of more favorably treated
secular gatherings, it is considerably more difficult to see why on the basis
of duration and proximity that these gatherings are fundamentally distinct
from that of religious gatherings.
Despite Chief Justice Roberts’s seemingly incomplete analysis, it is
difficult to ignore the importance of duration and proximity in evaluating the
comparability of gatherings in combating an airborne, contagious virus. And
despite noting the concurrence’s shortcomings, Justice Kavanaugh himself
did not directly address or evaluate the criteria of duration and proximity, nor
did he suggest other justifiable criteria. Instead, Justice Kavanaugh inquired
why someone can “safely walk down a grocery store aisle but not a pew?”232
This statement simply presumes that churches and grocery stores are
226. Id. at 1615.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. See Lighthouse Fellowship Church v. Northam, 458 F. Supp. 3d 418, 432 (E.D. Va.
2020) (classifying grocery stores, banks, and laundromats as essential).
232. S. Bay, 140 S. Ct. at 1615 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (quoting Roberts v. Neace, 958
F.3d 409, 414 (6th Cir. 2020)).
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comparable but does not address the justification of duration and proximity
or any justification at all. Therefore, it is unclear whether Justice Kavanaugh
believes that duration and proximity are justifiable grounds that were simply
incorrectly applied or if the criteria themselves are unjustifiable.
Despite providing intuitive criteria for discerning comparability between
gatherings, Chief Justice Roberts’s concurrence raised for more questions
than answers. Duration and proximity are helpful and intuitive in theory but
pose challenges for courts who are dealing with complex and case-specific
facts.
2. Deference to the State
Chief Justice Roberts’s concurring opinion is more often cited for its
passage on deference. Chief Justice Roberts declared that it is not the
judiciary’s place to determine when restrictions on particular gatherings
should be lifted, for such questions are “dynamic and fact-intensive matter[s]
subject to reasonable disagreement.”233 Instead, the “politically accountable
officials of the States” are deemed more equipped to act in areas “fraught
with medical and scientific uncertainties,” rather than the “unelected federal
judiciary,” which “lacks the background, competence, and expertise to assess
public health and is not accountable to the people.”234 In doing so, Chief
Justice Roberts echoed the deference notion raised in Jacobson v.
Massachusetts,235 which stated that a court should not “determine which of
two modes is likely to be the most effective for the protection of the public
against disease.”236
Justice Kavanaugh contested this notion, stating that although the state has
“substantial room to draw lines, especially in an emergency,” the
Constitution nevertheless provides key restrictions on line drawing, namely
that the “[s]tate may not discriminate against religion.”237 The Court must
be appropriately deferential to the expertise of public health officials in
evaluating potential distinctions between the secular gatherings listed in the
orders and religious gatherings.238 But such deference will not justify action
that is “beyond all question, a plain, palpable” violation of free exercise
principles.239
Broadly, the suggestion of deference is a reasonable and important one. In
a public health emergency, where there is “no known cure, no effective
treatment, and no vaccine,” it is understandable for the Court to defer to the
judgment of the political branches of government.240 Justice Kavanaugh

233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.

Id. at 1613 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
Id. at 1613–14.
197 U.S. 11 (1905).
Id. at 30.
S. Bay, 140 S. Ct. at 1615 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
See Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 31.
Id.
S. Bay, 140 S. Ct. at 1613 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
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conceded this point, merely stating that the state cannot discriminate against
religion while exercising such wide discretionary power.241
However, this deference raises two key issues. First, this deference may
thwart meaningful investigation of possible differentiators for evaluating
general applicability. By leaving the determination of categorizations to
“politically accountable officials,” courts do not evaluate whether the state
action is truly generally applicable but instead accept the justification
provided by the state.242 This seems irreconcilable with the judiciary’s
responsibility to protect fundamental constitutional freedoms. Although the
judiciary may lack “the background, competence, and expertise to assess
public health,” the courts are nevertheless the most competent and important
defenders of constitutional rights. The issue of comparing establishments is
critical to the determination of general applicability and, consequently, the
free exercise claim as a whole; to defer on this key issue may be
determinative for the claim in its entirety. Thus, the courts should be
empowered with further guidance on the protection of fundamental rights
rather than encouraged to readily defer to the judgment of the political
branches. For example, public officials may more competently determine
the relative impact of singing in the spread of COVID-19. However, the
Court should provide guidance to lower courts on how much significance
singing should be given relative to other criteria to determine general
applicability. Although public health may be beyond the judiciary’s
expertise, state actions may nonetheless deeply affect the very rights that the
courts were meant to protect. When it comes to such fundamental
constitutional rights, courts should be empowered to exercise their
competence in assessing the validity of free exercise claims before invoking
deference.
Second, the scope of deference is left unclear. Jacobson deference
requires courts to uphold the exercise of emergency police powers in
addressing public health measures unless (1) there is no real or substantial
connection to public health or (2) the state action is “beyond all question” a
“plain, palpable invasion of rights secured by fundamental law.”243 In other
words, only the clearest cases of discrimination will defeat deference to the
state. However, this seems irreconcilable with Chief Justice Roberts’s
statement that the categorization of gatherings is a “dynamic and factIf the
intensive matter subject to reasonable disagreement.”244
categorization of gatherings is inherently prone to reasonable disagreement
241. Id. at 1615 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (“The State also has substantial room to draw
lines, especially in an emergency.”).
242. In Judge Daniel Collins’s dissent in the Ninth Circuit decision below, he interpreted
deference to mean that the court was to determine “whether [the Governor’s] actions were
taken in good faith and whether there is some factual basis for [the] decision.” S. Bay United
Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 959 F.3d 938, 942 (9th Cir. 2020) (Collins, J., dissenting)
(quoting United States v. Chalk, 441 F.2d 1277, 1281 (4th Cir. 1971)), aff’d, 140 S. Ct. 1613.
Judge Collins emphatically rejected this seemingly low threshold as “fundamentally
inconsistent with our constitutional order.” Id.
243. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 25.
244. S. Bay, 140 S. Ct. at 1613 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (emphasis added).
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and not “beyond all question,” Jacobson deference appears indispensable,
particularly given that courts have no guidance in comparing entities for the
general applicability analysis. Again, this provides wide discretion for courts
to exercise deference. Perhaps in close cases, the courts may defer to the
judgment of the state. However, such a sweeping justification, as suggested
in South Bay, may be inconsistent with the judiciary’s responsibility of
protecting constitutional liberties.
Ultimately, deference is a reasonable concept in theory but one that must
not substitute or overshadow the need for a clearer standard for courts to
better evaluate general applicability. Otherwise, so long as “broad limits are
not exceeded,”245 deference allows courts to readily presume a finding of
general applicability. The Court in Jacobson recognized that the state’s
power in dire situations “is not absolute” and may go “beyond what was
reasonably required for the safety of the public, as to authorize or compel the
courts to interfere for the protection of such persons.”246 Thus, in assessing
the gravity of public health, the courts should not forsake their commitment
to protecting constitutional rights.
Accordingly, South Bay demonstrated the need for a clearer standard that
more carefully compares and contrasts relevant metrics for determining
which types of gatherings are and are not similar in their risk of spreading
COVID-19. Chief Justice Roberts’s concurring opinion provided a step in
the right direction by offering two possible criteria: proximity and duration.
In doing so, the case established two tenets of COVID-19 religious
exemption cases. First, if churches are restricted in a similar manner to
comparable secular gatherings in terms of proximity and duration, then the
relevant executive order is generally applicable; if generally applicable, no
further inquiry is required under Smith and the executive order is upheld.
Second, courts should defer to and recognize the broad limits of state power
when determining the categorization of businesses and establishments for
reopening.
C. Further Inconsistencies in Post–South Bay Decisions
Following the South Bay order, some cases adhered closely to Chief
Justice Roberts’s reasoning when comparing gatherings. In Legacy Church
v. Kunkel,247 the District Court of New Mexico concluded that movie theaters
and concert venues are most like religious mass gatherings in terms of “high
contact intensity and high number of contacts.”248 Similarly, in Elim
Romanian Pentecostal Church v. Pritzker,249 the Seventh Circuit deemed
worship gatherings to be more comparable to concerts and lectures than to
245. Id.
246. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 25. The Sixth Circuit recently echoed this notion, stating that
“[w]hile the law may take periodic naps during a pandemic, we will not let it sleep through
one.” Roberts v. Neace, 958 F.3d 409, 414–15 (6th Cir. 2020).
247. 472 F. Supp. 3d 926 (D.N.M. 2020).
248. Id. at 1037.
249. 962 F.3d 341 (7th Cir. 2020).
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more leniently treated secular gatherings, such as those that occur at
warehouses, grocery stores, and soup kitchens.250 Because “movies and
concerts seem a better comparison group,” the court stated that
“discrimination has been in favor of religion.”251 Interestingly, the court
stated its uncertainty as to whether warehouse workers engaged in “the sort
of speech or singing that elevates the risk of transmitting the virus” or that
the workers “remain close to one another for extended periods.”252 The court
admitted that “some workplaces present both risks” but quickly declared that
it was “hard to see how [essential workplaces] . . . could be halted.”253 In
some cases, the court did not conduct any comparative analysis. In Whitsitt
v. Newsom,254 the Eastern District of California merely reasoned that because
the California order was not “selectively enforced against religious entities
or that plaintiff’s church was [not] singled out,” the order was generally
applicable.255
However, in some cases, despite being presented with similar gatherings
and executive orders, courts have differed drastically in their conclusions,
and such variance in the protection of constitutional liberties warrants greater
guidance for courts. In Soos v. Cuomo,256 the Northern District of New York
ruled in favor of a church despite comparing it to similar establishments as
discussed in South Bay. Churches in New York had been restricted to 25
percent indoor capacity while other nonessential businesses, such as
restaurants, salons, retail stores, and educational services, were afforded 50
percent indoor capacity.257 Whereas Chief Justice Roberts noted that
churches constitute “large groups of people . . . in close proximity for
extended periods of time,”258 the district court applied this same reasoning
but in favor of churches, stating that salons themselves “involve the
congregation of people for a length of time.”259 Additionally, the court noted
that restaurant patrons “sit and congregate . . . in close proximity for a
lengthy period of time” while maintaining “close contact with their hosts and
servers” with no face coverings while seated.260 The court ruled that these
nonessential businesses were “not justifiably different than houses of
worship” and thus, the state order was underinclusive.261 The District Court
of the District of Columbia agreed in Capitol Hill Baptist Church v.
250. Id. at 346.
251. Id. at 347; see also Cross Culture Christian Ctr. v. Newsom, 445 F.Supp.3d 758, 770
(E.D. Cal. 2020) (“[T]he type of gathering that occurs at in-person religious services is much
more akin to conduct the orders prohibit—attending movies, restaurants, concerts, and
sporting events—than that which the orders allow.”).
252. Elim, 962 F. 3d at 347.
253. Id.
254. No. 20-cv-00691, 2020 WL 4818780 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2020).
255. Id. at *3.
256. 470 F. Supp. 3d 268 (N.D.N.Y. 2020).
257. Id. at 282.
258. S. Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 140 S. Ct. 1613, 1613 (2020) (Roberts,
C.J., concurring).
259. Soos, 470 F. Supp. 3d at 282.
260. Id.
261. Id.
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Bowser,262 similarly questioning why restaurants were treated more
favorably even though they involve “more than just providing food for
consumption [but also] serve as focal points for fellowship and communion,
not unlike worship services.”263 Contrarily, in Legacy Church, the court
upheld more lenient restrictions for restaurants, reasoning that restaurants are
“more transitory and so will involve less person-to-person contact.”264
Another prominent criterion was the indoor-outdoor distinction, primarily
when comparing religious gatherings to mass protests. Following the murder
of George Floyd, protestors gathered in major urban areas throughout the
nation to call attention to racial injustice and the specific need for police
reform. In Soos, depending on the region of New York State, outdoor
gatherings were restricted to either ten or twenty-five people.265 However,
Governor Andrew Cuomo and New York City mayor Bill de Blasio endorsed
the gathering of outdoor mass protests of several hundred people and allowed
150-person outdoor graduation ceremonies to proceed.266
The district court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs. Individual exemptions,
the court argued, signified that the law was “substantially underinclusive” of
nonreligious conduct that endangered the government’s interest in a similar
or greater degree than the religious conduct.267 The court first recognized
the limitation of Chief Justice Roberts’s deference argument––that “there are
‘broad limits’ which may not be eclipsed.”268 The court concluded that “it is
plain to this court that broad limits of that executive latitude have been
exceeded.”269 Governor Cuomo and Mayor de Blasio’s public comments
encouraging and applauding the protests were deemed to have created a de
facto exemption.270 Although they “could have just as easily discouraged
protests, short of condemning their message, in the name of public health,”
Governor Cuomo and Mayor de Blasio nevertheless “sent a clear message
that mass protests are deserving of preferential treatment.”271 With the added
exemption of 150-person outdoor graduation ceremonies, the court
concluded that the government may not refuse to extend that system of
exemptions to “cases of ‘religious hardship’ without compelling reason.”272
Contrarily, the District Court of Colorado in High Plains Harvest Church
v. Polis273 declared that there was no evidence in the record that would
262. No. 20-cv-02710, 2020 WL 5995126 (D.D.C. Oct. 9, 2020).
263. Id. at *9.
264. Legacy Church, Inc. v. Kunkel, 472 F. Supp. 3d 926, 1038 (D.N.M. 2020).
265. Soos, 470 F. Supp. 3d at 273.
266. Id. at 274–76.
267. Id. at 280.
268. Id. at 279 (quoting S. Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 140 S. Ct. 1613,
1613–14 (2020) (Roberts, C.J., concurring)).
269. Id.
270. Id. at 282.
271. Id. at 283.
272. Id. at 280 (quoting Emp. Div., Dep’t of Hum. Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 884
(1990)).
273. No. 20-cv-01480, 2020 WL 4582720 (D. Colo. Aug. 10, 2020), vacated, 141 S. Ct.
527 (2020) (mem.).
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support a finding that outdoor protests are comparable secular gatherings to
indoor, in-person church services.274 The court reasoned that relief should
be denied based on the “myriad of differences between the protests and
[religious] services,” namely that outdoor gatherings pose less risk of
spreading COVID-19 than indoor gatherings.275 Although the court in Soos
placed significant weight on the individualized exemption granted to
protests, the court here categorized the protests as an “unprecedented and
potentially explosive situation with a modicum of restraint” and found “little
trouble” in upholding the executive order.276 However, the Supreme Court
vacated the judgment in High Plains subsequent to the Court’s ruling in
Roman Catholic Diocese.277
Thus, although South Bay provided initial criteria for comparing
establishments, courts were nevertheless unguided on how to apply or
compare different criteria when evaluating general applicability.
Subsequently, the Court had an opportunity to step in and provide such
guidance in Calvary Chapel but ultimately failed to do so.
D. Calvary Chapel and the Ultimate Collapse of General Applicability
During COVID-19
COVID-19 free exercise jurisprudence reached its climax––and its most
controversial moment––with the Supreme Court’s order in Calvary Chapel.
If Lighthouse stands at one extreme, Calvary Chapel stands at the other. The
former justified lenient treatment for hospitals during a public health crisis.
The latter demonstrated that even casinos were favored over free exercise.
In Calvary Chapel, Nevada restricted religious gatherings to fifty people,
while other secular gatherings—most notably, casinos and their affiliated
entertainment venues—were permitted to admit 50 percent of their maximum
capacities.278 In a 5-4 decision, the Court denied injunctive relief for the
church.279
In their dissents, Justices Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh conducted a
Lukumi analysis in fierce opposition to the decision. They resoundingly
agreed that the Nevada orders were not neutral and generally applicable.
Justice Alito first denounced the decision, claiming that the Constitution
“guarantees the free exercise of religion” but that it says “nothing about the
freedom to play craps or blackjack.”280 He further claimed that the departure
from the Smith standard “is hardly subtle” because the directive “treats
worship services differently from other activities.”281 Justice Gorsuch found
“obvious discrimination,” remarking that “[l]arge numbers and close quarters
274. Id. at *2.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. High Plains, 141 S. Ct. at 527.
278. Calvary Chapel Dayton Valley v. Sisolak, 140 S. Ct. 2603, 2604 (2020) (mem.) (Alito,
J., dissenting).
279. Id. at 2603.
280. Id.
281. Id. at 2605.
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are fine in [casinos and movie theaters]” but churches “are banned from
admitting more than 50 worshippers . . . no matter the precautions at all.”282
Justice Kavanaugh simply stated that Nevada is “discriminating against
religion.”283
The dissenting Justices subsequently evaluated the Nevada directives
under strict scrutiny, declaring that “it is apparent that this discriminatory
treatment cannot survive.”284 Justice Alito argued that the state “cannot
claim to have a compelling interest” when it leaves “appreciable damage to
that supposedly vital interest unprohibited.’”285 Justice Alito added that the
state “has not shown that public safety could not be protected at least as well
by measures such as those Calvary Chapel proposes to implement.”286
Notably, Justice Kavanaugh more strictly applied Lukumi, stating that the
state “must articulate a sufficient justification for treating some secular
organizations or individuals more favorably than religious organizations or
individuals.”287 In Justice Kavanaugh’s view, the state had failed to provide
a “persuasive public health reason for treating churches differently from
restaurants, bars, casinos, and gyms.”288
Furthermore, Justices Alito and Kavanaugh rebuked Chief Justice
Roberts’s deference argument in South Bay. Justice Alito in particular
acknowledged the difficulties state officials faced at the outset of an
emergency and was understanding of the need for courts to tolerate very blunt
rules.289 However, he noted that at the time of the case, more than two
months had passed; Nevada had gathered more medical and scientific
evidence and therefore had had “time to craft policies in light of that
evidence.”290 Justice Alito raised concerns regarding the scope of deference,
stating that public officials are not given “carte blanche to disregard the
Constitution.”291 Justice Kavanaugh echoed this concern, stating that
“COVID-19 is not a blank check for a State to discriminate against religious
people.”292

282. Id. at 2609 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
283. Id. at 2613 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
284. Id. at 2608 (Alito, J., dissenting).
285. Id. (quoting Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520,
547 (1993)).
286. Id.
287. Id. at 2613 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (citing Emp. Div., Dep’t of Hum. Res. v.
Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 884 (1990)).
288. Id.
Justice Kavanaugh also considered the economic justification for the
discrimination. Id. at 2614 (“It is understandable for the State to balance public health
concerns against individual economic hardship. Almost every State and municipality in
America is struggling with that balance.”). Justice Kavanaugh ultimately rejected this
argument as well. Id. (“[N]o precedent suggests that a State may discriminate against religion
simply because a religious organization does not generate the economic benefits that a
restaurant, bar, casino, or gym might provide.”).
289. Id. at 2604–05 (Alito, J., dissenting).
290. Id. at 2605.
291. Id.
292. Id. at 2614 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).

1622

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 89

Thus, Calvary Chapel has added more complexity to free exercise
jurisprudence. Courts that have upheld state executive orders in the face of
free exercise claims have invoked, among others, the following reasons:
Secular entities such as hospitals and taxi services were favored because they
were essential in directly addressing the public health crisis.293 Restaurants
were found to be distinct from churches because dining experiences were
typically more transitory than scheduled church services with only a few
entryways.294 Gatherings such as those at grocery stores were favored
because they did not involve large numbers of people in close proximity to
one another.295 Gatherings at retail establishments were preferred because
they do not entail singing or chanting as is typical of church services. Some
courts have favored mass protests because they were held outdoors, as
opposed to typical worship services and because protests entail constitutional
freedoms of their own.296
The facts in Calvary Chapel directly opposed all of these arguments.
There is virtually nothing essential or constitutional about casinos and their
affiliated entertainment platforms.297 Visitors to Las Vegas gamble for more
than two hours per day on average, which exceeds the duration of most
religious services.298 Even at 50 percent capacity, casinos may draw
thousands of patrons, with average capacities far exceeding fifty persons per
venue.299 Live circuses, shows, and bowling tournaments seat hundreds of
spectators where visitors can sit together.300 The facts of Calvary Chapel
contradicted nearly every rational justification that courts have used to
uphold state orders. And yet the Court still upheld the order. Justice Gorsuch
put it best: “This is a simple case.”301 But the Court somehow still managed
to uphold a state action burdening religious practice.
E. Roman Catholic Diocese: Another Missed Opportunity by the Supreme
Court
In Roman Catholic Diocese, the Supreme Court was presented with yet
another opportunity to clarify the general applicability requirement.302
Contrary to South Bay and Calvary Chapel, in this case, the Court granted
injunctive relief for religious gatherings during the COVID-19 pandemic.303

293. See Lighthouse Fellowship Church v. Northam, 458 F. Supp. 3d 418, 430 (E.D. Va.
2020).
294. See Legacy Church, Inc. v. Kunkel, 472 F. Supp. 3d 926, 1038 (D.N.M. 2020).
295. See S. Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 140 S. Ct. 1613, 1613 (2020)
(Roberts, C.J., concurring).
296. See High Plains Harvest Church v. Polis, No. 20-cv-01480, 2020 WL 4582720, at *2
(D. Colo. Aug. 10, 2020), vacated, 141 S. Ct. 527 (2020) (mem.).
297. Calvary Chapel, 140 S. Ct. at 2603 (Alito, J., dissenting).
298. Id. at 2606.
299. Id. at 2604.
300. Id. at 2605.
301. Id. at 2609.
302. Roman Cath. Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. 63 (2020) (per curiam).
303. Id. at 65.
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However, although the Court presented viewpoints from several Justices, it
ultimately clarified little on the application of general applicability.
In Roman Catholic Diocese, Governor Cuomo used COVID-19 metrics to
designate specific regions as either red or orange and religious gatherings
were restricted to ten and twenty-five people respectively.304 A church and
a synagogue submitted applications seeking injunctive relief from these
restrictions.305 The Court’s opinion, issued per curiam, granted the
injunctive relief.306 The opinion first noted that establishments such as
“acupuncture facilities, camp grounds, [and] garages” and a large store with
hundreds of shoppers were subject to more lenient restrictions.307 The Court
concluded that such “categorizations lead to troubling results” and such
“disparate treatment” precludes general applicability.308 Having found
discrimination, the Court examined the restrictions under strict scrutiny. The
Court readily accepted that the state has a compelling interest in “[s]temming
the spread of COVID-19.”309 However, the Court ruled that the restrictions
were not narrowly tailored because they were “more severe than has been
shown to be required to prevent the spread of the virus.”310 Additionally, the
Court suggested that the state could have enforced maximum attendance
based on building capacities, a measure that could minimize health risks
while also minimizing the burden on free exercise.311 Because the state
failed to carry out more narrowly tailored measures, the Court ruled that the
Although Justice Kavanaugh’s
restrictions failed strict scrutiny.312
concurrence was remarkably similar to that of his dissent in Calvary Chapel,
Justice Gorsuch outwardly criticized Chief Justice Roberts’s deference
reasoning in South Bay as “towering authority that overshadows the
Constitution during a pandemic.”313 Justice Gorsuch’s concurrence
additionally reinforced the discrimination claim, stating that people similarly
“gather inside for extended periods in bus stations and airports, in
laundromats and banks” as they do in churches.314
In his dissent, Chief Justice Roberts provided no clarification on the
proximity and duration criteria he put forth in his South Bay concurrence but
defended his deference reasoning as nothing more than a simple assertion
that the politically accountable officials are entrusted “to guard and

304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 66.
Id.
Id. at 67.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 71 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
Id. at 69.
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protect.”315 In their dissents, Justices Breyer316 and Sotomayor317 returned
to the reasoning in South Bay that religious gatherings are more akin to
concerts, lectures, and movies rather than grocery stores, banks, or
laundromats. Notably, Justice Sotomoyor stated that South Bay and Calvary
Chapel provided a “clear and workable rule” for the state when implementing
executive orders: “they may restrict attendance at houses of worship so long
as comparable secular institutions face restrictions that are at least equally as
strict.”318 This statement is not instructive, however, and is merely a
reiteration of the very issue that courts continue to grapple with: how should
courts discern what are “comparable” gatherings?
Ultimately, the decisive question in this case was no different from that of
every other religious exemption case during the pandemic: are places of
worship more comparable to laundromats, banks, airports, and grocery
stores, or are they more comparable to concerts, lectures, and movies?
Justices Breyer and Sotomayor seem to suggest that science and
epidemiology should govern, thereby warranting greater deference to the
political branches.319 The Court’s per curiam opinion and the concurrences
suggest a wider spectrum of secular analogs where people are likely to gather
for an extended period of time.
Nonetheless, the Court has not yet explicitly formulated the relevant
criteria for comparing gatherings, nor has it provided careful guidance on
how courts should handle various criteria relevant to discerning general
applicability. The Court’s ruling in Roman Catholic Diocese has added yet
another complication and inconsistency to First Amendment jurisprudence
during COVID-19.
III. DISTINCTIVE TREATMENT FOR RELIGIOUS GATHERINGS UNDER STRICT
SCRUTINY
If Smith is overruled and strict scrutiny is the definitive standard, religious
entities may seek judicial relief even from generally applicable laws. Strict
scrutiny provides a heightened standard that is exceptionally demanding. But
even under such a legal standard, free exercise of religion should be afforded
distinctive treatment via a more careful and specific application of strict
scrutiny. Courts may use a low standard of rational basis when comparing
bowling alleys and restaurants. But when the constitutional right to free
exercise is at stake, courts should afford maximum protections to religious
entities and individuals.
States may nonetheless meet this high standard, particularly given the
nature of the COVID-19 pandemic. However, the demanding burden should
be placed on the state to prove that religion was exempted (or not exempted)
315. Id. at 76 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (quoting S. Bay United Pentecostal Church v.
Newsom, 140 S. Ct. 1613, 1613 (2020) (Roberts, C.J., concurring)).
316. See id. at 77–78 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
317. Id. at 78–80 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
318. Id. at 79.
319. Id. at 76.
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due to a compelling state interest. This distinctive treatment of religious
freedom is not a novel proposition but one that has been long overlooked
under Smith.
Part III.A details the elements of strict scrutiny and how each element can
be narrowly applied to protect religious liberty. Part III.B then argues that
courts should emulate the exemption granted in Yoder in evaluating free
exercise cases to further support a distinctive treatment of religion.
A. Narrower Application of Strict Scrutiny
Under Smith, cases under the RFRA or state equivalents have already
demonstrated the use of strict scrutiny to evaluate religious exemption cases.
In a world where Smith is overruled, courts must further define and
standardize the strict scrutiny elements to avoid the inconsistency that marred
the general applicability analyses. This section argues for a specific and
narrow application of the strict scrutiny elements to provide as much
protection for religious liberty as possible.
1. Substantial Burden
Under strict scrutiny, a church must first show a substantial burden on its
religious exercise. Generally, courts have readily accepted the assertion that
gathering restrictions place a substantial burden on religious practice; the
precise rationales were often presumed or overlooked.320 However, in
instances where the state challenges the substantial burden on churches,
courts should defer to the religious parties if the burden is placed on an
exercise grounded in sincere religious beliefs.
Free exercise case law establishes that courts are to defer to the religious
parties’ assertions about their sincerely held religious beliefs.321 For the
purposes of evaluating substantial burden, however, it is critical to
understand the religious party’s perspective in conducting a full strict
scrutiny analysis. Christian churches believe that their congregations must
meet in person each week to worship together. This is rooted deeply in
Scripture. Christians believe that God created humans as physical beings
who are called to gather and worship together.322 The Bible specifically
designates the church to be a corporate body, not just individuals.323
The significance of gathering in person is also evident in doctrine and in
practice. Most notably, the Lord’s Supper is an intimate and vital sacrament
for Christian denominations, requiring the physical administering of bread
and wine as the representation or embodiment of the body and blood of Jesus
Christ.324 Because the very nature of the Lord’s Supper is a physical sign
320. See Berean Baptist Church v. Cooper, 460 F. Supp. 3d 651, 662 (E.D.N.C. 2020)
(“[N]o one contests that the assembly for religious worship provisions . . . ‘burden sincere
faith practice.’” (quoting Roberts v. Neace, 958 F.3d. 409, 415 (6th Cir. 2020))).
321. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878).
322. See Acts 20:7; 1 Corinthians 15, 16:2; Genesis 2:7.
323. See Ephesians 4; Romans 12:3–8.
324. See Shorter Catechism, supra note 35.
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and seal of a spiritual promise and because the elements are to be set aside
by a minister, congregants cannot partake of the Lord’s Supper unless
gathering together physically.325
A substantial burden exists when a government action rises above de
minimis inconveniences and places “substantial pressure on an adherent to
modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs.”326 In other words, questions
of substantial burden arise when individuals are required to choose between
following their beliefs and receiving a governmental benefit or when
individuals must act contrary to their religious beliefs to avoid facing legal
penalties.
Nevertheless, despite accepting the sincerity of church beliefs, some cases
have questioned whether the availability of remote services, multiple
services, or drive-in services undermines any claims of substantial burden on
religious practice. In Capitol Hill, the state asserted that the church could
“hold multiple services, host a drive-in service, or broadcast the service
online or over the radio.”327 In doing so, the state argued that the church had
failed to prove that the gathering restrictions have substantially burdened the
church’s religious exercise.
The district court emphatically declared that the state “misses the
point.”328 The court reasoned that the claimed burden is based on sincerely
held theological beliefs and that the substantial burden inquiry does not ask
“whether [the Church] is able to engage in other forms of religious
exercise.”329 The court declared that it is for the church, not the state, to
define the meaning of “not forsaking the assembling of ourselves together,”
as indicated in the Bible.330 Thus, the court declared that restrictions on
gatherings should be interpreted as “foreclose[ing] the Church’s only method
to exercise its belief . . . as its faith requires.”331
Therefore, the availability of other formats for worship should not
foreclose the finding of a substantial burden under strict scrutiny. Many
cases will presume the substantial burden element, but when challenged,
courts must not judge how individuals comply with their own faith as they
see it.
2. The Compelling State Interest
The compelling state interest component has also been generally
presumed. In Roberts v. Neace,332 the court stated that “no one contests that
325. See Acts 2:46 (“And day by day, attending the temple together and breaking bread in
their homes, they received their food with glad and generous hearts.”).
326. Kaemmerling v. Lappin, 553 F.3d 669, 678 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (quoting Thomas v. Rev.
Bd. of the Ind. Emp. Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981)).
327. Capitol Hill Baptist Church v. Bowser, No. 20-cv-02710, 2020 WL 5995126, at *5
(D.D.C. Oct. 9, 2020).
328. Id. at *5.
329. See id. (citing Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. 352, 361–62 (2015)).
330. See id. (citing Hebrews 10:25).
331. See id. at *6.
332. 958 F.3d 409 (6th Cir. 2020).
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the Governor has a compelling interest” in combating COVID-19.333 In
Maryville Baptist Church, Inc. v. Beshear,334 the court similarly stated that
the state has a “compelling interest in preventing the spread of a novel, highly
contagious, sometimes fatal virus.”335 In Berean Baptist Church v.
Cooper,336 the court concluded that “no one contests the Governor’s
compelling interest in seeking to prevent the spread of COVID-19.”337
However, these broad notions fall short of fully protecting religious
liberties. Rather, courts should apply a closer reading of strict scrutiny under
the RFRA, highlighted in O Centro Espirita. There, in examining
exemptions for the religious use of the drug hoasca, the Supreme Court
rejected the state’s assertion that controlling a substance having “a high
potential for abuse” was a compelling state interest sufficient to survive strict
scrutiny.338 Instead, the Court stressed that under strict scrutiny, the burden
at issue must be on the person.339 In other words, the Court required “an
inquiry more focused than the Government’s categorical approach”340––an
approach that focused solely on “the particular use at issue here.”341
Therefore, rather than asserting the general importance of the state to regulate
harmful substances, the state was required to provide a compelling state
interest to explain why hoasca specifically should not be exempted.
Similarly, during the COVID-19 pandemic, courts must “look[] beyond
broadly formulated interests” of combating the spread of COVID-19.
Instead, courts must examine whether the state has adequately provided a
compelling justification for excluding religious worship from more favorable
executive order categorizations. Justice Kavanaugh advocated for this
position in his dissent in South Bay, stating that California’s compelling
justification required a distinction between the religious worship services in
question and the secular businesses not subject to occupancy restrictions.342
He repeated this assertion in his dissent in Calvary Chapel, stating that
Nevada had failed to demonstrate how the public health justification
specifically applied to allowing looser restrictions for casinos and bars but
not churches.343

333. Id. at 415.
334. 957 F.3d 610 (6th Cir. 2020).
335. Id. at 613.
336. 460 F. Supp. 3d 651 (E.D.N.C. 2020).
337. Id. at 662.
338. Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao Do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 432
(2006).
339. Id. at 423 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b)).
340. Id. at 430.
341. Id. at 432.
342. S. Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 140 S. Ct. 1613, 1615 (2020)
(Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
343. Calvary Chapel Dayton Valley v. Sisolak, 140 S. Ct. 2603, 2613 (2020) (mem.)
(Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (“Nevada undoubtedly has a compelling interest in combating the
spread of COVID-19 and protecting the health of its citizens. But it does not have a persuasive
public health reason for treating churches differently from restaurants, bars, casinos, and
gyms.”).
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This narrower approach is subtle, but it is critical in providing an additional
layer of protection for religious freedoms. Although preventing the spread
of COVID-19 was sufficient to satisfy rational basis under Smith, strict
scrutiny challenges the states to provide a fuller and narrower justification
for limiting constitutional rights. This is not an undue burden on states
because it leaves ample room for states to nevertheless succeed if the
justification is sufficiently compelling. Such a high standard is appropriate
in safeguarding the constitutional right to exercise one’s religion.
3. Narrowly Tailored: The “Least Restrictive Means” Standard
Most gathering restriction cases during COVID-19 have hinged on the
second requirement of “least restrictive means.” Some courts that were
generous in accepting states’ broad formulations of compelling state interests
nevertheless imposed injunctions finding the states had failed to satisfy the
least restrictive means criterion. In evaluating this element, courts must more
carefully and more strictly apply the standard in three particular ways: (1)
permitting substitute forms of worship should not render restrictions on inperson worship narrowly tailored, (2) a favoring of analogous secular
conduct is indicative of a violation of the least restrictive means standard,
and (3) the willingness of religious entities to conform their religious exercise
according to health requirements must be taken into account.
First, some cases have considered the availability of other platforms of
worship to signify—not the lack of substantial burden—but that the order
was the least restrictive means. In essence, states argued that because only
in-person services were restricted and other platforms were left intact, the
order was least restrictive in its application. This severely misses the point.
As mentioned, the presumption of viable substitutes for worship undermines
the churches’ right to determine its form of worship based on sincerely held
beliefs.344 To presume the validity of these substitutes is a misconception of
the sincere, religious basis for in-person worship. The necessity of in-person
religious worship “is not merely a matter of personal preference, but one of
deep religious conviction, shared by an organized group, and intimately
related to daily living.”345 The court in Neace further added that the state
cannot presume that “every member of the congregation has access to the
necessary technology” or that “every member of the congregation must see
[such technology] as an adequate substitute.”346
Second, the favoring of analogous secular gatherings should indicate that
the state had, at its disposal, options for achieving its objectives that would
burden religion to a far lesser degree. In Berean, the state could not provide
a rationale for allowing fifty people to gather indoors at a funeral but
restricting indoor church gatherings to ten individuals.347 Therefore, the
344. See Capitol Hill Baptist Church v. Bowser, No. 20-cv-02710, 2020 WL 5995126, at
*5 (D.D.C. Oct. 9, 2020).
345. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 216 (1972).
346. Roberts v. Neace, 958 F.3d 409, 415 (6th Cir. 2020).
347. Berean Baptist Church v. Cooper, 460 F. Supp. 3d 651, 661 (E.D.N.C. 2020).
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court ruled that the assembly for religious worship provisions were “not
narrowly tailored to accomplish the compelling interest in protecting public
health.”348 In Maryville, the Sixth Circuit invoked the Kentucky equivalent
of the RFRA, which parallels the RFRAs enacted by Congress and by other
states.349 In evaluating the Kentucky governor’s executive order that allowed
“typical office environments” but restricted drive-in church services, the
court determined that the order “[did] not amount to the least restrictive way
of regulating the churches.”350 The court questioned why the state permitted
hundreds of cars to be parked in parking lots but reprimanded those who
wished to park in a lot for religious purposes.351
Third and relatedly, even if there are no direct secular analogs, a court
should take into account a religious organization’s willingness and attempts
to incorporate health requirements when discerning the least restrictive
means. For example, in South Bay, churchgoers were willing to implement
social distancing measures, “requiring congregants to wear face coverings,
prohibiting the congregation from singing, and banning hugging,
handshakes, and hand-holding.”352 Under Smith, the court would not be
obligated to consider these circumstances but only to evaluate whether
churches in general should be excluded from more favorable categorizations.
However, under a stricter application of least restrictive means, the Court
may have acknowledged the church’s efforts to minimize its risks sufficient
to achieve the state’s compelling interest. By voluntarily “regulating the
specific underlying risk-creating behaviors,” the court held that the state can
nonetheless achieve its ends while minimizing the burden on religious
exercise.353
B. Reinstating Yoder-Like Exemptions
Such a careful and more precise application of the strict scrutiny test is not
a novel proposition. In fact, this was precisely the basis on which the
Supreme Court decided Yoder, the one true religious exemption case.354 The
Court first concluded that there was a substantial burden on religious
practice, finding that the compulsory education requirement through age
sixteen was “in marked variance with Amish values and the Amish way of

348. Id. at 663.
349. See Maryville Baptist Church, Inc. v. Beshear, 957 F.3d 610, 612 (6th Cir. 2020); see
also KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 446.350 (West 2021) (“Government shall not substantially burden
a person’s . . . . right to act . . . in a manner motivated by a sincerely held religious belief . . .
unless the government proves by clear and convincing evidence that it . . . has used the least
restrictive means to further [a compelling governmental interest].”).
350. See Maryville, 957 F.3d at 613.
351. Id. at 615.
352. See S. Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 959 F.3d 938, 946 (9th Cir. 2020)
(Collins, J., dissenting), aff’d, 140 S. Ct. 1613 (2020).
353. Id.
354. See McConnell, supra note 88, at 1110 (referring to Yoder as the “last major free
exercise victory”).
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life.”355 Second, the Court narrowly applied the compelling interest test,
declaring that where “fundamental claims of religious freedom are at
stake . . . we cannot accept such . . . sweeping claim[s]” of state interest.356
Instead, the Court stated that it was the state’s responsibility to specifically
show “with more particularity how its admittedly strong interest in
compulsory education would be adversely affected by granting an exemption
to the Amish.”357 Third, the Court ruled that compulsory education through
the age of fourteen accomplished the state’s interest in maintaining an
educated citizenry.358 Because the state interest could be achieved while
placing far less of a burden on Amish values, the Court ruled that the
compulsory education requirement was not narrowly tailored.359 Ultimately,
the Court granted the Amish an exemption from the compulsory education
requirement.
Such granting of religion-based exemptions was preempted by Smith,
limiting Yoder’s reasoning to be only applicable to “hybrid rights” cases.
However, a close reading of Yoder, as elucidated by Justice O’Connor in
Smith, demonstrates that the Court based its decision squarely on the Free
Exercise Clause alone and not on parental rights.360 The Court explicitly
concluded that testimony, history, and practice support the claim that
“enforcement of the State’s requirement of compulsory formal education
after the eighth grade would gravely endanger if not destroy the free exercise
of respondents’ religious beliefs” with no reference to parental rights.361
Such a claim was justified because the Amish were “capable of fulfilling the
social and political responsibilities of citizenship without . . . jeopardizing
their free exercise of religious belief.”362
Justice David Souter, in his concurrence in Lukumi, similarly challenged
the hybrid distinction as “untenable.”363 Justice Souter reasoned that
according to Justice Scalia’s definition of a hybrid claim, the scope of hybrid

355. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 211 (1972). The Court also found that “[a]gainst
this background, it would require a more particularized showing from the State on this point
to justify the severe interference with religious freedom such additional compulsory
attendance would entail.” Id. at 227.
356. Id. at 221.
357. Id. at 236.
358. See id. at 225. (“[The Amish] are capable of fulfilling the social and political
responsibilities of citizenship without compelled attendance beyond the eighth grade at the
price of jeopardizing their free exercise of religious belief.”).
359. See id. at 228–29.
360. Emp. Div., Dep’t of Hum. Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 896 (1990) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring). Justice O’Connor stated in her concurring opinion that
[t]he Court endeavors to escape from our decisions in Cantwell and Yoder by
labeling them ‘hybrid’ decisions but there is no denying that both cases expressly
relied on the Free Exercise Clause and that we have consistently regarded those
cases as part of the mainstream of our free exercise jurisprudence.
Id. (citations omitted).
361. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 219.
362. See id. at 225.
363. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 567 (1993)
(Souter, J., concurring).
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exceptions would be “so vast as to swallow the Smith rule.”364 Additionally,
if a hybrid claim involves another constitutional provision that is sufficient
ground for obtaining an exemption from a neutral and generally applicable
law, then “there would have been no reason for the Court in what Smith calls
the hybrid cases to have mentioned the Free Exercise Clause at all.”365
Ultimately, Justice Souter was not persuaded and believed that “fundamental
claims of religious freedom [were] at stake.”366 Professor Michael
McConnell stated that, by its own account, Smith itself should have been
classified as a hybrid case and undergone higher scrutiny.367 Professor
McConnell ultimately concluded that “the Smith Court’s notion of ‘hybrid’
claims was not intended to be taken seriously”368 and that one may
reasonably “suspect[] that the notion of ‘hybrid’ claims was created for the
sole purpose of distinguishing Yoder in [Smith].”369
If Smith is overruled, Yoder must be freed from this controversial “hybridrights” designation by Justice Scalia. As a practical matter, under Smith,
Yoder was typically regarded as either an exception to the general Smith rule
or as a “constitutional anomaly” to standard exemption analyses.370
However, Yoder has long been considered to be the “high watermark of free
exercise protection”371 and a “pinnacle of judicial recognition of free
exercise exemptions.”372 Its principled approach to examining free exercise
cases afforded substantial protections for religiously motivated conduct.373
Perhaps under Yoder as the commanding law in free exercise
jurisprudence, religious gatherings may have a claim to injunctive relief even
in situations where all other secular gatherings are restricted. Rather than
comparing religious gatherings to secular analogs, courts must look to grant
an exemption to religious parties “save in the most extreme
circumstances.”374 Certainly, COVID-19 has presented an abundance of
such extreme circumstances, and the state may reasonably and successfully
defend its executive orders. Thus, free exercise claimants undoubtedly face
a very steep hill in seeking exemptions during COVID-19; solely allowing
364. Id.
365. Id.
366. Id. at 566 (citing Yoder, 406 U.S. at 221).
367. See McConnell, supra note 88, at 1122.
368. Id.
369. Id. at 1121.
370. See Comment, Smith’s Free-Exercise “Hybrids” Rooted in Non-Free-Exercise Soil,
6 REGENT U. L. REV. 201, 203 (1995).
371. Richard S. Myers, The Right to Conscience and the First Amendment, 9 AVE MARIA
L. REV. 123, 127 (2010).
372. Elizabeth Harmer-Dionne, Note, Once a Peculiar People: Cognitive Dissonance and
the Suppression of Mormon Polygamy as a Case Study Negating the Belief-Action Distinction,
50 STAN. L. REV. 1295, 1304 (1998).
373. See Michael A. Helfand, Religious Institutionalism, Implied Consent, and the Value
of Voluntarism, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 539, 557–58 (2015) (“[B]oth the Sherbet and Yoder courts
afforded broad protection to religiously motivated conduct against the substantial burdens
imposed by otherwise valid laws—insisting that such religiously motivated conduct was
guaranteed free exercise protections save in the most extreme of circumstances.”).
374. Id.
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churches to open alongside hospitals is understandably a far-fetched
objective.
However, Yoder, at the very least, makes such claims possible and allows
free exercise claims to be tested against the harshest state laws. If state
actions are nevertheless upheld via strict scrutiny under Yoder, free exercise
claimants can be reassured that the severity of the public health situation
compels the curbing of the fundamental right to exercise religion. The
decision, however, should not be marred by inconsistent treatment of religion
under a low standard when a higher standard can afford better protections for
religious freedoms while nevertheless maintaining the state’s ability to assert
a compelling state interest.
The instinct to protect religious liberty is certainly not novel in American
history, nor is it limited merely to the religious. Justice Blackmun, in his
dissent in Smith, stated that the very purpose of drafting the Establishment
and Free Exercise Clauses was “precisely in order to avoid [religious]
intolerance.”375 James Madison stated that “[t]he Religion then of every man
must be left to the conviction and conscience of every man” and it must be
maintained as a “right of every man to exercise it as these may dictate.”376
Madison affirmed that “[i]t is the duty of every man to render to the Creator
such homage, and such only, as he believes to be acceptable to him.”377
In sum, should Smith be overruled, the Supreme Court should support a
narrow application of strict scrutiny to discern whether a state action that
burdens the free exercise of religion should nevertheless be upheld. This
narrow and demanding standard affords distinctive treatment for religious
liberties. This proposition is grounded in a simple principle: constitutional
rights deserve the highest protection. As Professor E. Gregory Wallace
stated, “[r]eligion requires special constitutional treatment precisely because
it involves something transcendent, objective, normative, and exclusive.”378
Fundamental rights are, by their very nature, inalienable and essential and
deserve the utmost protection by the judiciary.
CONCLUSION
COVID-19 gathering restrictions have exposed the current Smith standard
as misguided and inconsistently applied. Such an inconsistent standard
cannot be the determining factor in free exercise exemption analyses because
it undermines the distinctive treatment religion deserves. The narrow
375. See Emp. Div., Dep’t of Hum. Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 909 (1990) (Blackmun,
J., dissenting) (“I do not believe the Founders thought their dearly bought freedom from
religious persecution a ‘luxury,’ but an essential element of liberty––and they could not have
thought religious intolerance ‘unavoidable,’ for they drafted the Religion Clauses precisely in
order to avoid that intolerance.” (quoting id. at 888, 890 (majority opinion))).
376. See JAMES MADISON, A Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments
(June 20, 1785), reprinted in SELECTED WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 21, 22 (Ralph Ketcham
ed., 2006).
377. See id.
378. E. Gregory Wallace, Justifying Religious Freedom: The Western Tradition, 114 PENN
ST. L. REV. 485, 491 (2009).
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application of strict scrutiny under a Yoder-like analysis elevates free
exercise to a higher standard so that states rely significantly on the
compelling nature of the state interest rather than on comparisons with
secular analogs. This Note does not advocate undermining state efforts in
combatting COVID-19. It fully recognizes that individual rights secured by
the Constitution may nonetheless accommodate state efforts to combat a
pandemic. However, fundamental rights must always be afforded distinctive
treatment, for the true strength of constitutional guarantees shines brightest
when applied unhesitatingly in times of peace and crisis alike.

